

## **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007**

**WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2006**

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met at 10:14 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stevens, Specter, Domenici, Bond, McConnell, Shelby, Burns, Inouye, Byrd, Leahy, Dorgan, Durbin, and Feinstein.

### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

#### **OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY**

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

#### **ACCOMPANIED BY:**

**TINA JONAS, COMPTROLLER**

**GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS**

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. We had a vote that held us up. We appreciate your courtesy of being with us this morning.

We are going to hear from the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. They are joined by Secretary of Defense Comptroller, Tina Jonas. We're pleased to have the Department-level witnesses here before us, and we look forward to your testimony.

Today we want to discuss the fiscal year 2007 budget request for your Department. The budget request is \$423.2 billion in discretionary budget authority for the whole Department for the fiscal year 2007. As we review the Department's request, we do so ever mindful of those patriotic warriors who are fighting for our freedoms every day.

Mr. Secretary, General Pace, we're going to make your full statements a part of our subcommittee records. Let me turn first to the co-chairman of our subcommittee, and then we'll see if anyone else wishes to make opening remarks.

Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Because of the time constraint, sir, I put my statement in the record.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. I have also received a statement from the chairman of the full committee, Senator Cochran which I will insert into the record.  
[The statements follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE

Good morning Mr. Secretary. I want to join our chairman in welcoming you and General Pace as the subcommittee continues its Defense Department hearings on the fiscal year 2007 budget request.

During our hearings this year we received testimony from the military departments, the Guard and Reserves, the Missile Defense Agency, and the Surgeons General.

Next week we will conclude our hearings as we take testimony from members of the general public.

As we have listened to the testimony of officials in your Department, it is clear that they support your budget request.

DOD budgets are at record high levels, so it stands to reason that funding levels in the request should be sufficient to meet all the needs of the Department.

However, we find a number of areas where surprising shortfalls remain.

In health care, your budget assumes savings in excess of \$800 million for assumed legislative changes to increase beneficiary co-payments and efficiencies. Both House and Senate authorizing committees have rejected your proposals, so we now have a shortfall in this area.

We learned when the Navy testified that it had assumed significant "risk" in its readiness accounts. Its ship operating budget is woefully underfunded.

We are aware that the Air Force has used financial gimmicks to support a sustained production of the F-22, while the planned termination of the C-17 fails to take into consideration the need for more aircraft due to its overuse in Iraq.

The Army has insufficient funds to keep its M-1 program on track and is assuming a great deal of risk in its base operations funding.

So even in these times of record budgets we see that problems still exist. Add to that record high fuel prices and we know that our fiscal year 2007 Defense appropriations bill will require some major readjustment from the budget that you submitted.

Gentlemen, I am sure you know how much we appreciate your services. Managing this Department, especially in these challenging times requires duty above and beyond the call.

We thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thanks to you for inviting our witnesses today, and I look forward to their testimony.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to welcome Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace here today.

I join you in praising the efforts demonstrated by our military forces serving around the world. The state of Mississippi has over 500 of its servicemembers deployed in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, and is proud to be supporting the Global War on Terrorism. Last month, I talked with troops in Anbar province. They were motivated, their morale was great and they seemed focused on their mission.

As you know we are in the process of working through the differences between the House and Senate Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bills which contain funding for the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism. I am working hard to ensure differences are worked out and funding is provided as soon as possible, so our troops have the resources necessary to accomplish their mission.

It would be helpful for us to know how soon the Supplemental funds will be needed for the Global War on Terrorism and what impact there would be from any delay in receipt of this funding.

I thank you for your leadership of our military as they defend our national security interests. I am sure your insights about the fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of Defense will be helpful to us in our appropriations process. Thank you for your assistance to the committee.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Bond.

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, as I mentioned to the Secretary and the chairman, we are extremely proud of the job that our military is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. They don't seem to get credit for doing a great job, but we want our men and women in uniform, and the civilians who are working with them, to know that we appreciate the fact that they've been assigned a tough mission, they're doing it, and we appreciate it.

Thank you, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Burns.

Senator BURNS. I would just ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made part of the record.

[The statement follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONRAD BURNS

Mr. Chairman, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace welcome.

First of all, I would like to thank you for your exceptional service to our nation. I think it is important to remember that the strain that this nation took on September 11th was one that you felt personally, we speak of heroes in our Armed Forces, I would submit that there are a number of great American heroes before us today.

Our country has responded to the challenges faced by September 11th and we have sent a message to those who attack innocent civilians that we will not be victimized by terror. We will stand.

Our young men and women serving overseas are a testament to that stand. There has been a great deal of talk about the path to war, and the justification. Much of the dissent over the decision to go to war in Iraq has been shown to be false by the declassification of thousands of pages of documents which detail Saddam Hussein's efforts to mislead the international community, and hide his efforts to develop WMD. It is a shame that this evidence goes seemingly unnoticed in the media.

But, beyond that debate; I believe that it is important to remember that Americans, Iraqis, and our Allies are facing terrorists in Iraq today. Terrorists who believe that Iraq is the keystone to what they view as the beginning of a global jihad. If we lose in Iraq it will embolden our enemies. Enemies that seek nothing less than global war and conquest of everyone opposed to their radical agenda. I believe that we need to remember that we are fighting al Qaeda in Iraq, and if we don't defeat them there, we will be fighting them here.

Victory in Iraq will be a victory of the Iraqi people. The Iraqis will overcome oppression and terrorism and defeat those who would seek to divide their nation. We need to support that emerging democracy, and we need to support the democratic voice of the Iraqi people who have voted their desire to build one Iraq.

Our forces have been engaged around the world in the fight for democracy. I would like to take a moment to discuss our efforts to ensure that our young men and women and their families deployed around the world have a chance to participate in our democracy.

As you know, my colleagues and I are concerned about military voting. 17 Senators from both parties including a number of Senators who sit on this committee sent a letter to your office in March expressing our support for fixing the military voting process. As you know, we have a number of concerns about the effectiveness of the military process.

A major part of the problem is getting ballots to our service men and women in remote locations. I look forward to working with you to implement the Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS) in order to be able to solve a portion of this problem by emailing blank ballots to our service members.

In a recent report the GAO has cited concerns about the Federal Voting Assistance Programs (FVAP's) efforts to quantify military voter turnout. Low survey response rates, a lack of analysis of respondents, and a failure to conduct a sampling error analysis are all cited in the report. What this means is that the FVAP office cannot really tell us how many of our military service men and women voted, or what percentage of their votes were counted.

On the other hand the Election Assistance Commission estimates that 18 percent of military votes were not counted in 2004, another survey indicates the percentage may exceed 25 percent. Whether one in four military voters is disenfranchised or one in five: either way, this is unacceptable.

In addition the Election Assistance Commission is still waiting on the FVAP to provide a report of electronic voting efforts in the 2004 election. Without the results of this report it is difficult to determine how to move forward with the development of electronic voting initiatives.

I am certain that you share my concern that our young men and women serving overseas have the right to vote. I look forward to speaking with you on the subject in the near future.

Senator BURNS. And about the only thing I want to highlight this morning is—and I'll ask no questions on it, but I want the Secretary and the chairman to be aware that we're trying to install a new Federal Voting Assistance Program in the military and trying to get most of the ballots to our fighting men that are scattered around the world, and to get those ballots back, and to be counted. We seem to think that this is a very important part of their participation in this great country.

And we'd like to also acknowledge the great job that they're doing over there—and everywhere, in fact. And it's, I think, because we have great leadership here. And I thank you for coming this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, are there other witnesses you'd like to have identified for the record? I know you've got an array with you, but we're pleased to hear your comments.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to identify General Steve Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, who is also here with us.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.

General, nice to have you here.

Pleased to have your statement, sir.

#### SECRETARY'S OPENING STATEMENT

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee. We appreciate this opportunity to meet with you on the President's budget request for 2007 for the Department of Defense.

#### TRANSFORMATION

Yesterday, I met with a quite different gathering, the graduating class of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Many of them will be putting on the Nation's uniform and see service overseas in the months ahead. They'll join nearly 200,000 other talented young people who are slated to join the U.S. military this year, folks who could be something different, something easier, not to mention something safer, and for better pay, but who have chosen, instead, to raise their hands and step forward to defend our country.

The U.S. military that they are entering today is profoundly different from the force that existed when they applied to college 5 years ago. Our armed forces are in the process of transforming, and I want to highlight just a few of the significant shifts that have taken place and that are reflected in this budget.

First, the changes to our global posture. When I returned to this post in 2001, the U.S. military, though smaller, was arranged and operated much the same as it was when I was Secretary of Defense some 30 years before. In addition, U.S. forces were located around the globe in roughly the same places they were some 50 years ago,

when Soviet armored divisions were poised to cross the Fulda Gap and South Korea was then an impoverished nation devastated by the Korean war.

In a major overhaul of our country's global posture, thousands of U.S. troops and their families are returning to home bases in the United States, the first of some 170,000 servicemembers and dependents worldwide who will be affected over the next decade.

Just 3 or 4 years ago, the Army consisted of 48 deployable combat brigades organized within divisions, their basic building block since World War I. In the past, sending one brigade overseas required stripping out key headquarters and support elements from its parent division, essentially ending, or at least reducing, that division's ability to respond to any other contingencies.

Today, the service is well along in reorganizing into a more expeditionary force of 70 modular brigade combat teams across the Army's Active and Reserve components. These more agile, lethal, and more autonomous units can deploy and fight quickly with enough of their own firepower, armor, logistics, and administrative assets to protect and sustain themselves over time. Furthermore, as a result of reorganizing and rebalancing skills and positions across the force, tens of thousands of soldiers have been shifted from the institutional army, the "tail," which trains, supports, and administers the force, to the operational Army, that portion of the service that's organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight.

The effect of these initiatives by the Army is that a relatively modest increase in the overall size of the Army is leading to a significant increase in the deployable "boots on the ground," or "teeth," the on-call combat power for our Nation's defense.

#### NATIONAL GUARD

Five years ago, the Army Reserve and National Guard were configured as a strategic reserve to be called upon maybe once in a generation in the event of a major conflict on the scale of World War II. They were chronically undermanned, underequipped, and underfunded. For example, of the 34 Army National Guard combat brigades on paper, only 15 were even called "enhanced brigades" and supposedly ready for deployment. But even those brigades, year after year, were partly hollow and underequipped, and had to be augmented with people and equipment from other units before they could be deployed. Looking forward, instead of having only 15 so-called enhanced brigade—combat brigades, the Army Guard, aided by some \$21 billion in new funding that will replenish equipment and accelerate modernization, we'll have 28 brigade combat teams that will be fully manned and fully equipped, like their active duty counterparts.

We will see their flexibility with the President's proposal to temporarily increase the supporting role the Guard is already playing to secure our Nation's borders. The Department of Homeland Security is in the lead role, but Guard units may provide assistance, such as mobile communications, transportation, logistics training, and construction.

Military forces will not be involved in apprehension or detention of illegal immigrants. The up to 6,000 guardsmen and guardswomen proposed for this effort represent less than 2 percent

of the total National Guard force of some 400,000 plus. And, for the most part, they will be deployed during their 2 or 3 week “active duty for training” period. As such, this will not only not adversely affect America’s ability to conduct the war on terror or respond to other domestic emergencies, it will actually provide useful, real-life training for the members of the National Guard.

#### OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

Further, in 2001, when I came back to the Department, the military had 132 unmanned aerial vehicles of all types and sizes. Today, it has more than 3,000. In 2001, prior to September 11, the Army had less than 500 up-armored Humvees. Today, it has more than 12,000.

Next, some 20,000 positions that previously had been performed by uniformed military personnel are today being performed by civilians, thereby freeing up 20,000 U.S. servicemen and servicewomen for truly military tasks and assignments, and thousands of additional positions are currently slated to be converted from military billets to civilian billets over the next 5 years.

#### NAVY

As for the Navy, a few years ago three out of four ships in the U.S. Navy were not deployable at any given time because of long maintenance and training cycles, which was the product, really, of a peacetime culture and a peacetime mindset. By applying advanced research and development, innovative maintenance and training, and a variety of cost-savings initiatives, the Navy leadership has changed the way our fleet operates and deploys. Today, the percentage of the fleet routinely at sea has increased by more than 50 percent. The Navy then was able to deploy only three carrier strike groups, and surge to two within 30 days; today, it can have six and with the ability to surge one additional carrier strike group within 90 days.

A word about special operations forces, very briefly. In the past, those forces were largely limited to augmenting conventional operations and training foreign militaries. Since 2002, the special operations command (SOCOM) has grown by 6,000 troops, its budget has nearly doubled. They’ve come a long way from the time when, as General Pete Schoomaker—he used to lead that unit—put it, “The special operations forces were more like a sports car that was never driven for fear of denting the fender.”

We’ve overhauled both the way we plan for contingencies and the way we deploy forces. The Department’s deployment process was governed previously by a somewhat inflexible cold war process that was really designed for total peace or total war—lever on, lever off, with very little in between. The Department has worked aggressively to overhaul the planning process so that contingency plans can be better kept up to date to reflect more current assessments.

#### MEETING NEW CHALLENGES

The military has undertaken the historical changes I’ve mentioned while fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and across the globe in the struggle against violent extremism. All of the many

changes to personnel and the way the military plans and fights, to structure and organization, and to training and doctrine, have involved having the military challenge old assumptions and old habits. At various points along the way, the proposed changes have understandably met some resistance—within the Department, in the Congress, in the industrial complex, and certainly in the press. Change is difficult in any large organization, particularly one like the U.S. military that's been so successful over the decades in doing what it does best, which has been to fight large armies, navies, and air forces in battles along the line of the first gulf war.

But, increasingly, the challenge today is more than simply large armies. It is irregular and asymmetric threats. But if there was any doubt about the necessity and the urgency of these changes when President Bush first took office in January 2001, it should have been dispelled 9 months later, when it took only 19 men, armed with box cutters and tourist visas, to kill nearly 3,000 of our fellow citizens. And today that enemy, though under constant pressure and on the defensive, is still conspiring to bring murder and suicide to our cities. This long war, this struggle against violent extremists is a central security issue of our time. The campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters in the war on terror have added new impetus and urgency to the efforts to transform the Department.

The unprecedented and complex task before us, in what could be a decades-long campaign against extremism, has prompted a series of shifts in the military's approach to its traditional missions, its tactics, its techniques, and its procedures. One of the most important shifts underway is in the role and importance of intelligence.

The U.S. military has long excelled in engaging targets once they've been identified. We have begun a major effort to ascertain where the enemy is going next, rather than where the enemy was, and to be much better able to find and fix, as well as what the military has always done very well—namely, finish. This means significantly upgrading and refocusing U.S. intelligence capabilities, both human and technological, and more effectively linking intelligence to operations in realtime in the field. This is an enormous challenge for the dedicated and talented men and women in the U.S. intelligence community, and clearly it will take some time to achieve our goals.

A word on the Department's role in the overall intelligence community since September 11. Thoughtful people across the Government have been trying to find the right structures, the right arrangements, so that we can provide the very best intelligence to protect the American people. Everything we're doing to upgrade and adjust the intelligence capabilities within the Department has been coordinated with the other agencies of the Government, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and down the line. It is a constructive process, and, indeed, a continuous process, despite some of the breathless and fictitious speculation of bureaucratic intrigue that we see in the daily press.

## PROGRESS IN IRAQ

A word on Iraq. Iraq will soon be governed, for the first time, by a permanent government of national unity elected under a new Iraqi constitution that they wrote and they voted on. It's entered a hopeful new phase in what has been a long and difficult journey, from being ruled by one of the most brutal tyrannies in the 20th century to having a representative government and a free political system.

Secretary Rice and I met with Prime Minister-designate Malaki and other Iraq elected leaders last month. They seemed to be very serious people who recognize that they have a window of opportunity to make headway on the serious challenges that their nation faces.

These developments make it all the more important that the Congress approve the President's full supplemental request for operations in the global war on terror (GWOT). I know this hearing is on the 2007 budget, not the supplemental, but I have to say that delay in passing the supplemental puts the military services' critical accounts—in particular, operations, maintenance, and training accounts—at risk, as the services are already being forced to try to reprogram funds from other parts of their budgets under restrictions as to the amounts they can reprogram. The Army and Marine Corps are already being forced to defer contract obligations and supply requisitions due to impending budget shortfalls.

In addition, cuts and delays in providing funds for the Iraqi security forces would undermine what has been truly significant progress in turning over greater responsibility and territory to Iraq's army and police forces. Please keep in mind that these kinds of cuts most certainly will increase the burden on the taxpayer over the long term.

It costs some 10 times as much to recruit and train and deploy an American serviceman as it does an Iraqi soldier, and it costs more than twice as much to sustain a U.S. soldier in the theater than it does an Iraqi soldier. Any slowdown in funding for training and equipping the Iraqi security forces has the added harmful effect of postponing the day when our men and women in uniform can continue to pass off more responsibilities to the Iraqis and come home.

Mr. Chairman, I started my remarks by mentioning a group of young people who are graduates, yesterday, donning their Nation's uniform for the first time. I'll end by referring to another group of young people that I encountered very recently, who are already serving the country and sacrificing.

Two weeks ago, I went to the United Service Organizations (USO) station in Atlanta's Hartsfield Airport to visit with a large group of young Army soldiers, Active and Reserve and National Guard. They had been in Iraq for 6 months. They had been home for their 2 weeks. I had a chance to—and I hope others will do this—I had a chance to shake hands with them and visit and thank them personally for their service to the country. And it was interesting to me that when we left, and watched them, they went down the escalator into the terminal, people there, waiting for other airplanes, spontaneously clapped and stood up as these folks put their



duffel bags on their shoulders and moved to charter flights, as I recall, to take them back over, and then into Iraq. It's a reflection, I think, not only of the high regard that our troops are held, but also of the fundamental decency and strength of the people of the country they serve. It reflects the appreciation and the support for their service that has been manifested by this subcommittee and by the Congress and the people you represent.

#### PREPARED STATEMENT

So, I thank you for your support in this complex and difficult struggle. The troops have done everything that's been asked of them, and they have done so with courage. And we owe it to them, and to the country that they have sworn to protect, to see that we provide the resources and the capabilities that will not only win today's wars, but also best assure peace in the decades ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

With me today is General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We appreciate the opportunity to meet with you in support of the President's budget request for the Department of Defense.

Yesterday, I met with quite a different gathering—the graduating class of the Virginia Military Institute. Many of those young men and women are putting on our nation's uniform, and will see service overseas in the months and years ahead. They will join nearly 200,000 other talented young people who are slated to join the U.S. military this year—young men and women who could be doing something different, something easier, not to mention safer, and for better pay—but who have chosen instead to raise their hands and step forward to defend their country.

The U.S. military that many of those graduates are entering today is profoundly different than the force that existed when they applied to college five years ago. And while our Armed Forces are in the process of transforming, it might be useful to highlight some of the most substantive and significant shifts that have taken place.

#### GLOBAL POSTURE

First, consider changes to our global posture.

When I returned to this post in 2001, the U.S. military, though smaller, was arranged and operated much the same as it was when I was Secretary of Defense some 30 years before. In addition, U.S. forces were located around the globe in roughly the same places they were some 50 years ago—when Soviet armored divisions were poised to cross the Fulda Gap and South Korea was an impoverished nation devastated by war.

In a major overhaul of our country's global posture, thousands of U.S. troops and their families are returning to home bases in the United States—the first of 170,000 service members and dependents who will be affected over the next decade. Heavy Army units that had previously been garrisoned in fixed positions to defend against particular adversaries—some of whom no longer exist—are being relocated and reconfigured to be able to move rapidly wherever needed.

We have also undertaken a major revision of the military's force posture here at home, with the largest round of domestic base closings and adjustments in our history—reforms that will save American taxpayers billions of dollars in future decades.

#### U.S. ARMY

Consider the dramatic changes to the U.S. Army.

Just three years ago, the Army consisted of 48 deployable combat brigades organized within divisions—their basic “building block” since World War I. In the past, sending one brigade overseas would require stripping out key headquarters and support elements from the rest of its parent division, essentially ending or reducing that division's ability to respond to other contingencies.

Under the leadership of Secretary Fran Harvey and General Pete Schoomaker, the service is well along in reorganizing into a more expeditionary force of 70 “modular” Brigade Combat Teams across the Army’s Active Component and National Guard. These more agile, lethal, and more autonomous units can deploy and fight quickly—but with enough of their own firepower, armor, logistics, and administrative assets to protect and sustain themselves over time.

Furthermore, as a result of reorganizing and rebalancing skills and positions across the force, tens of thousands of soldiers have been shifted from the “Institutional Army”—the “tail,” which trains, supports, and administers the force—to the “Operational Army” that portion of the service organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight.

The effect of these significant initiatives—combined with investments in new weapons and technologies like the Future Combat Systems—is that a relatively modest increase in the overall size of the Army is leading to a truly significant increase in the deployable “boots on the ground,” or “the teeth”—the combat power on call for our nation’s defense.

Consider that five years ago, the Army Reserve and National Guard were configured as a strategic reserve, to be called on once in a generation, in the event of a major conflict on the scale of World War II. They were chronically undermanned, under equipped, and under funded. For example, of the 34 Army National Guard combat brigades on paper, only 15 were called “enhanced,” and supposedly ready for deployment. But even those brigades, year after year, were partially hollow and under equipped, and had to be augmented with people and equipment from other units before being ready to deploy.

Looking forward, instead of having only 15 so-called “enhanced” combat brigades, the Army Guard—aided by \$21 billion in new funding that will replenish equipment and accelerate modernization—will have 28 Brigade Combat Teams that will be fully manned and fully equipped, like their Active Duty counterparts.

Today, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve is becoming an “operational reserve,” capable of taking on a range of missions at home and abroad. We have seen this in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the Guard’s impressive response to Hurricane Katrina.

#### NATIONAL GUARD ON THE BORDER

We will see it again with the President’s initiative to increase the supporting role the Guard is already playing to secure our nation’s borders. The Department of Homeland security is in the lead role, but Guard units may provide assistance such as mobile communications, transportation and logistics training, and construction. Military forces will not be involved in the apprehension or detention of illegal immigrants. The up to 6,000 Guardsmen and women proposed for this effort represent less than two percent of the total National Guard force of some 400,000, and for the most part they will be deployed during their active duty for training. As such this will not adversely effect America’s ability to conduct the War on Terror or respond to other domestic emergencies.

#### WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Weapons systems such as the Crusader artillery system and the Comanche helicopter, conceived during and designed for the Cold War, have either been cancelled or reduced. In other cases, we have made new and innovative use of older platforms, such as the SSGN—a 20-year old Trident nuclear ballistic missile submarine that has been converted to carry Navy SEALs and capable of launching conventional cruise missiles.

Further:

—In 2001 when I came back to the Department, the military had 132 unmanned aerial vehicles of all types and sizes. Today it has more than 3,000; and

—In 2001, prior to 9/11, the Army had less than 500 up-armored Humvees. Today, it has more than 12,000.

#### MANAGING THE FORCE

Some 20,000 positions that previously had been performed by uniformed military personnel are today being performed by civilians, thereby freeing up 20,000 U.S. servicemen and women for truly military tasks and assignments. And, thousands of additional positions are slated to be converted from military billets to civilian billets over the next five fiscal years.

About 10,000 civilian employees are for the first time being managed under the new National Security Personnel System that allows for greater flexibility in hiring, promotion, and assignment.

## BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

When President Bush took office, the United States had no defense against long-range strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. An initial capability has now been deployed that will increase over time.

## NEW ORGANIZATIONS

In light of the new global threats, the Department has set up new organizations, commands, and leadership positions, including:

- An Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense;
- A new Northern Command to help to defend our country—which showed its value in the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina; and
- A Strategic Command that now oversees, among other things, defenses against ballistic missiles, and various other unconventional capabilities.

## NAVY

A few years ago, three out of every four ships in the U.S. Navy were not deployable at any given time because of long maintenance and training cycles—the product of a peacetime culture and mindset.

By applying advanced research and development, innovative maintenance and training, and a variety of cost savings initiatives, Navy leadership has changed the way our fleet operates and deploys.

Today, the percentage of the fleet routinely at sea has increased by more than 50 percent. The Navy then was able to deploy only three Carrier Strike Groups and surge two within 30 days. Today it can surge six, with the ability to surge one additional Carrier Strike Group within 90 days.

## SPECIAL OPERATIONS

A word about special operations forces.

In the past, these forces were largely limited to augmenting conventional operations and training foreign militaries.

Today, the Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, is also a supported command, and has recently added a Marine Corps element.

Since 2002, SOCOM has grown by 6,000 troops and its budget has nearly doubled. They have come a long way from the time when, as General Pete Schoomaker once put it, the special operations forces were like a sports car that was never driven for fear of denting the fender.

## LEADERSHIP APPROACHES

In the past, certain positions were reserved for those from certain services who had followed a certain career path. Given the new challenges our forces face, we now have, for the first time:

- A Marine as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs;
- A Marine leading NATO and Strategic Command; and
- A Navy Admiral leading Northern Command and NORAD.

In addition, the President picked a former Special Forces officer out of retirement to become Army Chief of Staff.

Not only are these flag and general officers doing a fine job at fulfilling the traditional duties of these positions, they have brought a fresh joint perspective and approach to the Commands they now lead.

## WAR PLANNING

We have overhauled the way we plan for contingencies and the way we deploy forces. In the past, an enormous amount of effort and many months went into assembling detailed contingency plans that would then sit on the shelf while the world and the conditions in it continued to evolve and change. And the Department’s deployment process was governed by an inflexible Cold War process that was designed for total peace or total war—a “lever-on, lever-off” system—and nothing in between.

A case in point. As General Franks and his team at Central Command went to work to provide the President with a proposal for liberating Iraq, he felt that a modified approach was needed. His plan and deployment process were designed to do several things:

- Preserve options and flexibility for the President as the United States and our allies pursued a diplomatic solution;

- Try to ensure that Saddam Hussein did not provoke a wider war by attacking Israel, as he had done in 1991 with Scud missiles; and
- Wish to prevent Hussein from torching Iraqi's oil wells, and creating an environmental catastrophe similar to what he left behind in Kuwait.

And there were other factors to consider:

- The Iraqi military was weaker than it had been during the First Gulf War, while the U.S. military, though smaller, was significantly more capable in emphasizing a number of technology advances;
- A prolonged war could inflame the publics of the region—there was no Al Jazeera in 1991—and potentially destabilize key allies and partners; and
- Garrisoning Iraq with many hundreds of thousands of American troops—which would have entailed moving a large part of the active U.S. Army to the Middle East—could provoke resentment on the part of ordinary Iraqis at such a visible and intrusive foreign presence.

The plan General Franks and his CENTCOM team developed, with consultation and input from the Department's senior leadership—including the Joint Chiefs of Staff on numerous occasions—was designed to:

- Maintain an element of surprise;
- Move with speed and agility;
- Depose Saddam Hussein as quickly as possible before he could do more damage to the Iraqi people and to the region; and
- Maintain force levels high enough to provide a level of protection and security, but without such a heavy intrusive presence that might feed an insurgency and impede Iraqis from transitioning to governing and defending themselves—which they are now gradually doing.

The Department has worked aggressively to overhaul the planning process for the Combatant Commands so that contingency plans are being kept up to date to reflect more current assessments.

#### RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

The military has undertaken the historical changes I've mentioned while fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and across the globe in the long struggle against violent extremism.

All of the many changes—to personnel, to the way the military plans and fights, to structure and organization, and to training and doctrine—have involved challenging assumptions and habits. At various points along the way proposed changes have understandably met some resistance within the department, the military, the press, the government, the Congress, and the industrial complex.

Change is difficult in any large organization, particularly one like the U.S. military that has been so successful over the years at doing what it does best—which has been to fight other large Armies, Navies and Air Forces in battles along the lines of the First Gulf War. But increasingly the challenge today is more than only large armies—it is irregular or asymmetric threats. There is truth to the saying that "if you do something, some people are not going to like it." And they will be heard from, let there be no doubt.

#### THE LONG WAR

But if there was any doubt about the necessity or urgency of these changes when President Bush first took office in January 2001, it should have been dispelled 9 months later when—despite the expenditure of more than \$2 trillion on defense and intelligence over the previous decade—it took only 19 men, armed with box cutters and tourist visas, to kill nearly 3,000 of our fellow citizens and bring our nation to a virtual standstill.

And today, that enemy, though under constant pressure and on the defensive, still conspires to bring its cult of murder and suicide to our cities—and to those of our allies as well.

This "long war"—this struggle against violent extremists—is a central security issue of our time. The campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters in the Global War on Terror have added new impetus and urgency to the efforts to transform underway in this Department.

Our enemies challenge free societies through non-traditional, asymmetric means, using terror as their weapon of choice. Their goal is to break America's resolve—the will of our free people—through the aggressive use of propaganda and carefully plotted attacks to garner headlines and instill fear.

They are willing to employ every means—every lie, every atrocity and every available technology—to achieve their aims. They have become experts at manipulating the global media to both inspire and intimidate.

## SHIFTING OUR EMPHASIS

The unprecedented and complex tasks before us in what could be a decades-long campaign against violent extremism has prompted a series of shifts in the military's approach to its traditional missions, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

One of the most important shifts underway is the role and importance of intelligence. The U.S. military has long excelled at engaging targets once they have been identified. We have begun a major effort to ascertain where the enemy is going next, rather than where the enemy was—to be much better able to “find” and “fix,” as well as what we have always been able to do—namely to “finish.” This means significantly upgrading and refocusing U.S. intelligence capabilities—both human and technological—and more effectively linking intelligence to operations in real time in the field. This is an enormous challenge for the dedicated men and women in the U.S. intelligence community. And it will take some time to achieve.

The U.S. military is the largest consumer of intelligence. In the past, that term usually referred to tactical battlefield information, such as the size, location, and disposition of enemy forces, and the like. In the 21st Century, however, intelligence information can no longer be put into neat little categories. A single piece of information can simultaneously be of tactical intelligence value to the local military commander on the ground, but also of potential strategic intelligence value to our government.

A word on the Department of Defense's role in the overall intelligence community: since September 11, and indeed since President Bush first took office, thoughtful people across this government have been trying to find the right formulas, the right structures, and the right arrangements so that we can provide the very best intelligence to protect the American people.

Everything we are doing to upgrade and adjust the intelligence capabilities within the Department of Defense has been worked out and coordinated with the other appropriate agencies of the government—the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, the State Department, the FBI, and on down the line. It is a constructive and open process, and indeed a continuous process—despite some of the breathless fictitious accounts of bureaucratic rivalry and intrigue that are repeatedly published in the press.

In addition, not just the military, but our government, needs to shift from reacting to crises—as has been the case for much of our country's history—to preventive action to keep problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming conflicts. We are also shifting from the natural American impulse to try to do everything ourselves to helping partners and allies develop their capacity to better control their territory and to better defend themselves and us against these new challenges. This is particularly important in a Global War on Terror where many of our nation's most dangerous enemies function within the borders of countries that we are not at war with.

These new priorities have prompted the military to undertake some non-traditional missions in non-traditional places. For example, a joint task force headquartered in Djibouti conducts civil affairs, training, and security operations with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, and Yemen. The weapons in this unconventional conflict are schools, clinics, and shovels. As one serviceman said, “We're fighting a war down there and [we] haven't fired a shot.”

This shifts are so important because of the nature of the conflict we are in. The enemy would like to define this war as a conflict between Islam and the West—but it is not. It is, in fact, a struggle within the Muslim world—between the overwhelming majority of Muslims and that small number of violent extremists. The vast majority of Muslims do not share the violent ideology of al-Qaeda. They have children and families they care about. They hope for a better future for themselves and for their countries. They do not want the extremists to win. And many are courageously opposing them at every opportunity.

## IRAQ

We see this dynamic at work in Iraq, soon to be governed for the first time by a permanent government of national unity, elected under their new Iraqi constitution. Iraq has entered a hopeful new phase in what has been a long and difficult journey—from being ruled by one of the most brutal tyrannies of the 20th Century, to having a representative government and a free political system.

Secretary Rice and I met with Prime Minister-designate Maliki and Iraq's other newly elected leaders last month. They seem to be serious people who recognize that they have a window of opportunity to make headway on the serious challenges their nation faces.

The security situation in Iraq remains a serious challenge. But every day, every week, and every month, Iraqi forces grow in size, confidence, and capability, and are taking over more and more responsibility for larger swaths of their own country. U.S. military and Coalition forces continue to play an important role, but their mission has shifted fundamentally over the past year—from conducting military operations to assisting Iraqi forces as they take the fight to the criminals and the terrorists who threaten their sovereign nation.

More than a quarter million trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces are now in the fight on behalf of the Iraqi people.

The size and disposition of U.S. forces in Iraq are continuously being assessed by General Casey and his commanders on the ground. Decisions about Coalition troop levels will be based on their recommendations, as has been the case since the earliest planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Since being liberated three years ago, Iraq has been governed by a series of temporary arrangements—a governing council under the Coalition Provisional Authority, an appointed sovereign government, and then an elected interim government. Though these were necessary arrangements, they were nonetheless temporary, and thus, understandably, engendered a certain amount of uncertainty about the future. The establishment of a new permanent government, under a Constitution the Iraqis wrote, and which was overwhelmingly ratified by the Iraqi people, is a significant step forward—it is truly historic.

Iraq is today the central front in the War on Terror. Our enemies know this, even if some commentators in the West seem not to. Osama Bin Laden, referring to the United States, recently said: “Their defeat in Iraq will mean defeat in all their wars.” Ayman al-Zawahiri, his deputy, said: “The arena of jihad in Iraq is now the most important arena of jihad in this age.” And let there be no doubt, while the priorities of the extremists are focused on Iraq, their ambitions do not end there, especially if the free world were to lose its will just as the Iraqi people have begun to chart a hopeful new course.

#### SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

These developments make it all the more important that the Congress approve the President’s full Supplemental Request for operations in the Global War on Terror.

In addition to paying for ongoing deployments and operations by U.S. forces in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters, this supplemental request includes funds to:

- Train and equip Afghan and Iraqi security forces—a critically important initiative;
- Counter the threats posed by Improved Explosive Devices;
- Continue the needed transformation of the U.S. Army into more capable modular Brigade Combat Teams and support brigades; and
- Repair and replace damaged or destroyed equipment.

Delay in passing this Supplemental puts the military services critical accounts—in particular operations, maintenance, and training accounts—at risk as the services are forced to try to reprogram funds from other parts of their budgets. The Army and Marine Corps are already being forced to defer contract obligations and supply requisitions due to impending budget shortfalls.

In addition, cuts and delays in providing funds for Iraqi Security Forces will undermine what has been truly significant progress in turning over greater responsibility and territory to Iraq’s Army and Police forces. Keep in mind that these kinds of cuts most certainly will increase the burden on the U.S. taxpayer. After all, it costs some ten times as much to recruit, train, and deploy an American service member versus an Iraqi soldier, and more than twice as much to sustain a U.S. soldier in theater. Any slowdown in training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces has the added harmful effect of postponing the day that our men and women in uniform can return home.

Finally, the addition by Congress of non-requested, non-emergency related items in the supplemental legislation will have the effect of forcing trade-offs concerning support for our troops in the field.

At \$439.3 billion, the President’s Department of Defense budget request for fiscal year 2007 represents a 7 percent increase from what was enacted last year. This is a great deal of money, though at about 3½ percent of gross domestic product, it represents a considerably smaller fraction of America’s gross domestic product than when I came to Congress during the Kennedy Administration.

I understand that on the House side some significant reductions have been made in the President’s budget submission. It is important that the President’s defense request be fully funded.

## MENTAL HEALTH

Before closing, I would like to draw your attention to an issue that has been the source of some coverage and commentary in recent days—much of it inaccurate—and that is the Department's programs for screening and treating mental illness amongst service members. For starters, no military in history has done more to identify, evaluate, prevent, and treat mental and other health needs and concerns of its troops and their families. We have screened more than 1 million service members before, during, and after deployments.

The Department has put in place a number of programs and processes to address this issue. They include:

- Placing combat stress and mental health teams in theater;
- Setting up world-wide support systems for soldiers and their families; and
- Implementing a new program to assess and meet with every service member three to six months after they return home from an overseas deployment.

The conclusion in the draft Government Accountability Office report that only 22 percent of returning service personnel identified as at risk for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder are referred for mental health support is misleading. The 22 percent figure does not account for numerous other service members who were identified and referred to their primary care physician or other professional counseling. This is exactly what we designed the surveys to do—help us identify issues and provide the proper level of care for our people.

## CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I started out this testimony by talking about one group of young people who are donning our nation's uniform for the first time.

I will end by referring to another group of young people I recently encountered who have been serving and sacrificing for our country now for a good many months and years.

Two weeks ago I stopped by the USO station at Atlanta's Hartsfield Airport to visit with several dozen Army soldiers—Active, Reserve and National Guard. They were about to return to Iraq after their mid-tour break. I shook hands and I was able to personally thank them for their superb and courageous service to our country. And then the troops slung their duffle bags on their shoulders and quietly filed down the escalator en route to the charter flight that would take them back to Iraq. As they entered the main airport area below, various travelers in the waiting area started to take notice, and they began to stand up and clap—first in ones and twos, until just about everyone in that airport was applauding. Quite a different reception than that which many U.S. soldiers received just over a generation ago.

I am told this type of scene is being replayed often in airports all across the nation.

This is a reflection not only of the high regard in which our troops are held, but of the fundamental decency and strength of the people of the nation they serve. It reflects the appreciation and support for their service that has been manifested in this Committee and by the Congress.

I thank you for your support. In this complex and difficult struggle the troops have done everything asked of them—and done so with courage. We owe it to them—and to the country they have sworn to protect—to provide the resources and the capabilities that will not only win today's wars, but also best to assure peace in the decades ahead.

Thank you.

[Disruption in the audience.]

Senator STEVENS. Whoever that is, will security please remove them?

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. What you've said, at just the end, about total respect for our men and women in uniform, I think, was demonstrated last night at the Olympic dinner. There was just overwhelming reaction to the young men and women there that came from Walter Reed to be with us. And it is something to witness, and we are all very proud of that.

You mentioned the supplemental, so let me also mention it. I have had a talk with General Pace and with other officers involved in the departmental activity. We are approaching a Memorial Day recess, and that recess will take us into June. It's my under-

standing that the—finishing that and getting it to the President is absolutely necessary before that recess starts. Do you share that opinion?

#### SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely. General Pace is correct. We simply do need the supplemental passed, and signed, and those funds available by the end of this month.

Senator STEVENS. Well, there are a whole series of issues involved in that. I'm no longer chairman of that full committee, but I know that Senator Akaka has a very difficult job. But I do appreciate that. We must carry that word to the conferees, that it just has to be done.

When you look at the problems we have, you also mentioned the National Guard. We're glad that General Blum is here to discuss that. You have mentioned that there is adequate funding for—or personnel for this activity that the President has announced—I'm sure we'll all support—and that is the deployment of 6,000 of the guardsmen and guardswomen to assist in the border activities. Will you need immediate funds for that? Can you—can the Department handle that between now and September, or do we have to have a supplemental for that, also?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think the Office of Management and Budget is considering that at the moment, as to what the Department of Homeland Security, which is in the lead in this respect—I do not have any recent information on that.

Do you know? Tina Jonas may have an answer.

Senator STEVENS. Ms. Jonas.

Ms. JONAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. We are working currently with the Office of Management and Budget to understand the resources that will be needed to do this. My understanding is that they will be forwarding to Congress some details on those resource requirements shortly.

Senator STEVENS. Thank—

Secretary RUMSFELD. The—

Senator STEVENS [continuing]. You very much.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Department of Homeland Security is in the process, and should, by today or tomorrow, provide the Department of Defense the tasks that they would like us to consider performing to support their efforts—they, being in the lead. And, as you know, our forces would not be doing law enforcement or standing on the border arresting people or anything like that. They would be more in the technical area of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and language translations, and various types of communications support, and that type of thing—

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. General—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. As well as construction.

Senator STEVENS. General Pace, my apology. Did you have a separate statement you wished to make?

#### STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER PACE, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will be brief, but if I may say just a few things, sir.



Senator STEVENS. Yes. Good.

General PACE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, Members of the subcommittee. It is my distinct honor to sit before you for the first time as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to represent the 2.4 million men and women in the Armed Forces—Active, Guard, and Reserve—who are doing a fabulous job for this country—they have never let us down—and, on behalf of them, to thank each of you for your support, not only the resources you provide, but, equally importantly, the time you take to visit our troops in the field, the time you take to visit them in the hospitals—it makes a difference—and to take this opportunity in front of you to thank not only our military members, but their families. Their families serve this country equally well as anyone who has ever worn the uniform. They sit silently at home and pray for their loved one, wait for news of their return, and then silently stand back and pretend that they had nothing to do with our success; whereas, in fact, it's the love and support of our families that makes all the difference in the world to all of us who wear the uniform.

I'm also proud to tell you that, for myself and for the Joint Chiefs, as a whole, that we clearly—your Armed Forces clearly are ready and fully resourced to conduct all the missions that this Nation expects of us. Over the last 12 to 18 months, we've had—the work that has been done on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), on the budget for fiscal year 2007, on the national military strategy—this has included literally hundreds and hundreds of hours of deliberations amongst the senior uniformed and civilian leadership of the Department—to my knowledge, in an unprecedented way. It is focused in on winning the war on terrorism, on accelerating the transformation, on enhancing our joint war-fighting, and in improving the quality of life for our servicemembers. And this collaboration continues as we develop the roadmaps ahead to execute the QDR.

As the Secretary pointed out, we are in a long war. Our enemy is ruthless and patient, and they have a plan. And they know that they cannot defeat us on what we consider to be a traditional battlefield, but their battlefield is different from ours. They are focused on our will, our cohesion as a Nation. And it will require our Nation's long-term patience and endurance to defeat this enemy.

There are two areas in which I think Congress can help, for sure, as we look to the future, because as we seek to defeat this enemy, we are going to need a very robust application of all the elements of national power, which means, in my mind, among other things, an interagency collaboration and process that is effective, efficient, and quick to decide. We need to find ways, as you all did for us with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the results of that Goldwater-Nichols Act being a military that is interoperable, leading quickly to interdependent. We need to find ways in the interagency process to encourage and reward cross-agency work experience, education, and training, and also to find a way to encourage and reward those in other agencies who deploy with our troops overseas and do our Nation's important business that they are the experts in doing.

## PREPARED STATEMENT

Last, we have an All-Volunteer Force. In truth, it's an all-recruited force. They have not let us down. They will not let us down. But we need the Nation's assistance, and all of the leaders and mentors in the Nation, to impress upon our young folks how honorable it is to serve this Nation, not only in uniform, but in any way that fits their own roles in life. If we do that collectively, then those of us who receive our most precious products, our young men and women, our sons and daughters, and who are taking care of them, will be able to sustain the force that we have and continue to fight this Nation's battles.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER PACE

Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my pleasure to report to you on the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. On behalf of all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense Civilians, and our families, thank you for your continued bipartisan support. That support has been exemplified this past year by Congressional visits to our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world; visits to those hospitalized; your funding for operations; your support of transformation and recapitalization initiatives; and the improved pay and benefits you have provided to our Service members and their families.

Our successes in the War on Terrorism are due in large measure to the dedicated and patriotic sacrifice of our Nation's Service members. I want to thank them and their families for all they have done and continue to do to maintain our freedom.

We are in a long war. Our enemy intends to destroy our way of life. They seek to expel American influence from the Middle East, overthrow the existing secular governments of the region, and establish a fundamentalist religious empire on which to base eventual global domination. To accomplish this they intend to defeat the United States and our Allies—not militarily, but by targeting our unity and our will. They aim to undermine our resolve by attacking civilians; taking hostages; inflicting casualties on Coalition forces; and using propaganda. They believe they can win against the world's most powerful nation because they see us as lacking the moral stamina to persevere in defense of our beliefs.

This is not a struggle between America and Islam. Rather it is a conflict between those who love freedom and a terrorist minority attempting to take power from the majority. Our opponents are loosely networked and transnational. They are ruthless, adaptive, and convinced that they will win. They intend to do so by destroying the resolve of the America people by gradual attrition. They are a patient foe.

For the first time, America's All Volunteer Force is fighting a long war. Our troops and their families know their Nation truly appreciates their service and values their sacrifice. Sustaining our troops and upholding the resolve of our Nation requires our collective leadership. We must underscore for the American public both the nature and importance of the conflict we are fighting.

We traditionally think of war in conventional terms such as the Second World War during which the average American had a family member serving in combat, and shared their sacrifice on the home front through the rationing of goods. This is not the conflict in which we find ourselves today. Thankfully, the daily life of the average American citizen reflects none of the hardships or shortages we associate with a nation at war.

Unlike past wars, territory conquered and enemy armies destroyed are not apt measures of success. The true metrics are public perception and the resolve of free peoples to determine their own future. Our national commitment to a long-term effort is key in this fight, because the enemy neither expects nor intends to defeat us in the short term.

It is also important to acknowledge that the U.S. military has a significant role to play but that it will not win this war operating alone. Our interagency partners play vital roles in bringing to bear all the elements of national power to ensure long term success.

To defeat our enemies and protect our Nation, we must simultaneously prevail in the War on Terrorism and prepare for the future. The proposed fiscal year 2007 Budget ensures we have the ability to conduct a broad spectrum of operations. Major conventional conflict, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, antiterrorism, stability operations, humanitarian assistance at home and abroad, disaster relief, forward presence, global deterrence, support to civil authorities, and homeland defense each require the application of tailored forces. The proposed budget funds this wide range of military capabilities, and provides our forces with the superbly trained and equipped men and women we need to defend America and its interests.

As stated in our biennial review of the National Military Strategy, we are well positioned to accomplish our missions. Our Armed Forces stand ready to defend the homeland, deter conflict, and defeat adversaries. Allies and coalition partners play important roles in meeting these challenges. If an unanticipated contingency should occur, our formidable capabilities and those of our many partners around the world will ensure we prevail.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) underscores the need to address today's operational requirements and those of tomorrow. It emphasizes the importance of winning the War on Terrorism, accelerating transformation, strengthening Joint Warfighting, and taking care of our most precious resource—our people. The QDR represents a significant effort to understand what capabilities are needed over the next two decades and is part of an ongoing continuum of change for the nation's armed forces. In particular, it underscores the value of speed and precision as force multipliers. The QDR reflects an unprecedented level of collaboration and teamwork amongst the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department. Our senior defense leaders are continuing this dialogue, and we are developing roadmaps to achieve the Review's goals for the future.

#### WIN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Iraq remains the central front in the War on Terrorism. Our mission there is clear. We are fighting to defeat terrorists and to help the Iraqis build a democratic, secure, and economically sound nation—an ally in the War on Terrorism. Our ultimate victory in Iraq will profoundly affect the security of the United States, our allies, and the entire globe.

The past year in Iraq has seen significant challenges, but also remarkable successes. The Defense Department's Report to Congress on "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" describes the situation in detail. The steadily growing participation in three national elections in 2005 vividly illustrated the determination of the Iraqi people—Shia, Sunni, and Kurd—to embrace democracy, as does their formation of a new government. Entrepreneurial activity has significantly increased. Most importantly, the Iraqi people are increasingly taking greater responsibility for their own security. These successes demonstrate genuine progress and flow directly from the hard work of our troops and interagency partners.

Effective governance, the rule of law, economic growth, and social well-being can only flourish on a strong foundation of security. We will continue to aggressively assist Iraqi security forces to assume greater responsibility for a stable and secure Iraq. Commanders on the ground will continue to make force level recommendations based on conditions not timetables.

The War on Terrorism is not restricted to the boundaries of Iraq. As the events of the past few months have shown, we continue to combat terrorists in Afghanistan. In partnership with the Afghan National Army, our forces are actively engaged in rooting out the Al Qa'ida and Taliban. Likewise, our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, consisting of civilian and military professionals from the United States and our Coalition partners, assist Afghans at the local level in building a stable and free society. An indicator of our accomplishments in Afghanistan, as well as a catalyst for continued success, is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's initiative to take on a greater role in strengthening security and development. This summer, NATO will assume responsibility for the southern sector of Afghanistan and position itself to later do so throughout the entire country. These international efforts reach beyond Afghan borders and help the region choose stability over conflict.

We are combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. The Abu Sayaf Group in the southern Philippines and Al-Qa'ida's partner Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia present these friendly nations unique challenges. We are forging relationships, building capacity, sharing information, and conducting focused training with these valued allies. We are also working with other nations to strengthen maritime security in the Strait of Malacca and other strategic waterways. Our efforts contribute substantively to regional security and freedom of the seas.

In Africa, we continue to partner with regional organizations and individual nations to improve their capacity to combat terrorism, secure borders and coastlines, and reduce ungoverned space. The Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative—developed in coordination with the Department of State—improve the ability of countries to foster security and stability within their own borders.

In addition to regional initiatives, an array of coalition and interagency partners continue to work with us globally against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Legislation authored over a decade ago for cooperative threat reduction and counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction anticipated one of today's most serious challenges. We continue that effort. The Proliferation Security Initiative expands international intelligence sharing, coordinated planning, and capabilities integration. Similarly, our ability to execute counter-proliferation operations is enhanced by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Maritime Interdiction initiative.

Defense of the homeland itself remains a key mission in the War on Terror. Our efforts to defeat employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terror groups, as well as a strong response capability should those efforts fail, are critical. Terrorist attacks here at home against the Nation's citizens, its infrastructure, and its leadership must be prevented. Our efforts to date have been successful but constant vigilance is necessary.

We are also confronting the threat of narco-terrorism. Ongoing multilateral operations promote security, improve effective border control, deny safe havens, and impede the ability of narco-terrorists to destabilize societies. Combating drug trafficking has particular importance for strengthening security and democracy in our hemisphere. Engagement with our Latin American neighbors to shape events and forestall crises is vital to protecting democracy for us all.

Strategic communication is a significant component of the War on Terror. Terrorists rely upon propaganda to deliver their message and justify their actions and are not constrained by truth. We must counter those efforts. Our actions, policies, and words must reflect and reinforce our strategic goals and national ideals. What we communicate to our friends and foes is at least as important, if not more so, as what we do on the battlefield. We need a more cohesive U.S. government effort in this area.

In the War on Terror, our allies and coalition partners execute key roles in defeating terrorists on and off the battlefield. Their capabilities and regional expertise are complementary to our own. As we move ahead in combating terror, we do so increasingly in combination with other nations who understand the danger terrorism poses to their citizens.

#### ACCELERATE TRANSFORMATION

As the threats to our Nation evolve, so must the capabilities of our Armed Forces. Transformation today remains vital to the defense of the United States tomorrow. It is a process, not an end state.

Transformation is more than harnessing advanced technology. Transformation includes rethinking our doctrine and operational concepts; adapting professional education and training to meet new challenges; restructuring our organizations and business practices to be more agile and responsive; improving our personnel policies; and reforming our acquisition and budget processes. Nowhere is this more evident than in our effort to increase interagency collaboration. Defeating terrorists requires more than the use of military force. We must harness and synchronize all the instruments of national power to win the War on Terrorism.

Advancing a transformational mindset and culture that readily embraces interagency integration begins with our Nation's strategic guidance documents. Interagency collaboration is a theme throughout our National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Security Cooperation Guidance, and Unified Command Plan.

Nonetheless, we can still do more to enhance interagency effectiveness. Twenty years ago, there were serious institutional obstacles to our Armed Services operating as a Joint team. Today, in no small part due to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the U.S. military is increasingly a true Joint force, interoperable and moving towards interdependence.

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation established a system of incentives and requirements to foster Jointness among military officers. We need to find similar ways to encourage interagency expertise. Rewarding interagency work experience, education, and training will facilitate better synergy between departments. Likewise, we need and should reward individuals and agencies that rapidly deploy and sustain civilian

expertise in tandem with our military. Shared deliberate and crisis planning capacity among our interagency partners will also improve our Nation's readiness for contingencies.

We are working to better integrate our Nation's diplomatic, military, intelligence, information, and economic instruments to forestall and address crises overseas, and to be ready to deal with catastrophic terrorism, natural disasters, and pandemic disease at home. Defense support to civil authorities is an essential component of protecting the Nation. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought this home. The American people expect their Armed Forces to respond in times of crisis. Teamwork among our Armed Forces and federal, state, and local government agencies—as well as private and volunteer organizations—is vital to the security of our Nation's citizens. Accordingly, we are preparing now to deal with circumstances that have the potential to overwhelm local government and private institutions. U.S. Northern Command is expanding its ability to take action swiftly in a variety of incidents, including providing military support to large-scale disaster relief operations and responding to the outbreak of pandemic disease.

While transformation will allow us to better deal with contingencies at home, it will also improve our ability to boost the capacity of other nations to defeat terrorism and stop its spread while contributing to the security and stability of nations. The Army's Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth and the Marine Corps' Foreign Military Training Units are breaking new ground in this endeavor. Likewise, International Military Education and Training is a proven means of creating friendships that pay long term dividends when international classmates later work alongside U.S. forces in overseas operations. Constraints on our ability to implement this important program warrant review. These and other initiatives are examples of the value of developing capabilities and relationships to help promote security and stability worldwide, potentially precluding a need to commit significant amounts of U.S. resources to stabilize troubled nations abroad.

Our foreign assistance framework was designed to influence and reward behavior during the Cold War. We need a new foreign assistance framework for the War on Terrorism to develop the security capabilities of fledgling democracies and advance regional stability. Thank you for the Section 1206 legislation, which has empowered our capacity to boost the counter-terrorism training of other nations. It has made a positive difference in fighting the War on Terrorism. The support we provide our partners is essential to helping them police their own land and eradicate terrorist safe havens. Continual assessment of the countries that we assist, and the aid we allot, ensures that we are helping appropriate nations in the right way.

It is not enough for us to be successful in responding to today's challenges. We need to shape the future with like-minded allies and partners. An essential element of this process is the transformation of our Global Posture. We are implementing a new Global Posture for defeating terrorism, deterring conflict, and bolstering the security of both established and nascent democratic states. This realignment will better position us to shape the future. This is well illustrated in U.S. European Command's reorientation of its forces from Cold War-era basing to an expeditionary forward presence that supports our friends and helps deny havens for our foes.

In addition to transforming our conventional force posture, while maintaining a reliable nuclear force, we are shifting from our Cold War strategic deterrence to a New Triad with broadened focus on conventional long range strike. Prompt global conventional strike capabilities are required in the War on Terror as well as in future contingencies. In parallel with our efforts to develop a conventional long range strike capability, we are improving our missile defenses and national command capability. Your support for these efforts will turn our traditional triad into a strategic deterrence capability relevant to tomorrow's challenges.

Finally, as we transform our warfighting forces, the Department will do the same for the acquisition and budget processes that provide material resources for our troops. Transforming the way capabilities are developed, fielded, and integrated enhances our capacity to execute a wide range of missions.

#### STRENGTHEN JOINT WARFIGHTING

The U.S. Armed Forces' capacity to operate as an integrated joint team is one of America's chief advantages on the battlefield. By jointly employing our Armed Services we leverage their complementary capabilities as a team.

We can and should go beyond our current level of Jointness. Strengthening our Joint Warfighting ability enables us to make strides forward in the War on Terrorism. It also accelerates transformation. To maximize our operational performance, we will transition from an interoperable force into an interdependent force.

While doing this, we must maintain the expertise, culture, and traditions of the Services from which our military competence flows.

Joint Professional Military Education of our military and civilian professionals provides the foundation of our force. We intend to better integrate our interagency and international partners in these successful education programs. In addition, our Joint Exercise Program provides valuable training for the Combatant Commanders' Joint and multi-national forces. At home, we are working with the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security to establish a national security exercise program to help prepare senior leaders across the Federal government to confront crises more effectively.

In strengthening Joint Warfighting, we continue to review, develop, and disseminate doctrine and operating concepts. The Joint Chiefs in consultation with the Combatant Commanders ensure that our doctrine and concepts provide a solid foundation for Warfighting. Those same concepts and doctrine also help shape the strategic guidance which drives operational execution.

Our education and training, as well as our doctrine and operational concepts, are kept relevant by capturing lessons gained from experience. Our professional development and organizational agility is significantly enhanced by lessons observed from the War on Terrorism, and other operations, including disaster relief at home and abroad.

As seen in deployments to the Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the Pakistan earthquake, our standing, rapidly deployable Joint Task Force headquarters dramatically improve our operational responsiveness. To enhance this capability, we will organize, man, train, and equip selected three-star and two-star Service headquarters to rapidly deploy as Joint Task Force headquarters.

We are adapting our organizational structure to better exploit the intelligence we collect. The creation of Joint Intelligence Operations Centers at our Combatant Commands increases support to units in the field. In addition, the Joint Functional Component Command—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, set up this year under the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command, deconflicts competing demands by coordinating the allocation of intelligence collection assets. These initiatives bring the analytical firepower of the Intelligence Community to bear for our troops on the ground, in the air, and on the sea.

We are also harnessing technological developments to enable faster sharing of data among agencies, but we cannot rely solely upon technology. Intelligence collection, analysis, fusion, and dissemination depend upon our intelligence professionals. Human Intelligence is a vital enabler for collecting, understanding, and communicating information on threats and contingencies. Service programs for recruiting, training, and retaining key intelligence specialties have been refined to ensure we meet the increasing demand for intelligence personnel.

We continue to examine how best to re-capitalize and invest in our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities. Sensor platforms that collect across multiple mediums are one approach. High altitude, long loiter unmanned aerial vehicles are another. Space based platforms should focus on surveillance capabilities that we cannot readily replicate elsewhere.

In addition to benefiting our surveillance, space based platforms also play a central role in communications. Our deployed forces' strategic, operational, and tactical connectivity depends on the use of global, high bandwidth communications currently only available via satellites. As the gap between operational demands and military satellite communications capacity grows, we will continue to rely upon commercial vendors for the foreseeable future. We are also exploring alternatives to space-based communications.

Networked ground, air, and maritime communications systems are the means with which the U.S. Armed Forces share information and work together as a team. New Joint acquisition strategies to replace Service-unique communications systems will advance our communications capacity across the electromagnetic spectrum. Common secure networks with allies will further increase coalition capability. In addition, the exponentially increasing importance of cyberspace requires that we increase our efforts to operate effectively both offensively and defensively throughout the Information Domain.

In the realm of logistics, we are actively working to leverage our unmatched capabilities. The Joint Staff, the Services, the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Defense Logistics Agency work together to meet the personnel, equipment, and materiel needs of our Combatant Commanders. However, both the challenge of adapting to changing operational requirements and the demand to increase efficiencies require that we continue to enhance our logistics capabilities. Along these lines, we are working to improve unity of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise

logistics response. For example, as our distribution process owner, U.S. Transportation Command has strengthened our supply chains from factory to foxhole.

Reconstituting the force presents real challenges. Our weapons systems and vehicles have experienced extensive use in Iraq and Afghanistan. Supplemental appropriations have helped us repair and refit during combat operations, nonetheless, we have more work ahead to ensure our forces remain combat-ready. Your support for resetting the future force is critical.

As we reset, the combat power of our Total Force is being increased. By moving the Reserve Component from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, we ensure it will be accessible, ready, and responsive. The Services have already rebalanced approximately 70,000 positions within or between the Active and Reserve Components. We plan to rebalance an additional 55,000 military personnel by the end of the decade and also continue converting selected military positions to civilian billets. This revised Total Force structure will provide us with greater combat capability and leverage the complementary strengths of our Active, Reserve, and Civilian workforces.

#### IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF OUR SERVICE MEMBERS AND OUR FAMILIES

Taking care of our people is fundamental to the ethos of the American Armed Forces. Our men and women in uniform are our most precious resource. We must continue to ensure their welfare and that of the families who support them. The most advanced ship, aircraft, or weapon system is of limited value without motivated and well-trained people. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that the Nation's security rests in the capable hands of the individual Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine.

Quality of life, of course, transcends material considerations. Our young men and women join the Armed Services to patriotically and selflessly serve something larger than themselves. They serve with pride, and their families willingly bear the burden of sacrifice, because they believe they make a difference.

A clear indication that our personnel in uniform understand the importance of their service and appreciate the quality of life that we provide them is their decision to stay in our Armed Forces. Our retention levels are over one hundred percent of Service goals. To underscore the point that our men and women serve because they know they are making a difference, units that have deployed multiple times to combat have seen the highest rates of retention. We are also seeing success in our recruiting.

We are grateful to the Administration and to the Congress for closing the pay gap between the private sector and the military, as well for vastly improving military housing and enabling our family members to enjoy a good standard of housing if they choose to live in the local community.

To our families, protecting our troops in combat is the most important measure of quality of life. Since April 2004, all Defense Department personnel in Iraq, both military and civilian, have been provided Interceptor Body Armor. However, as the threat has changed, we have continually improved body armor to ensure our troops have the latest and the best possible protection. Our latest improvements defeat armor piercing rounds and include shoulder armor and side plates.

In addition to body armor, armored vehicles are important to force protection. Thanks to your support we have had great success increasing production and fielding up-armored Humvees to protect our troops. Nearly all the approximately 40,000 tactical wheeled vehicles in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility now have armor protection. We will continue to adapt as the threat evolves.

Improvised Explosive Devices illustrate the asymmetric challenges we will face in the future. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization spearheads our work to meet that threat. Bringing a senior commander's operational perspective to this effort, retired Army General. Montgomery Meigs, former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe and NATO's peacekeeping force in Bosnia, is leading this fight. With the development and testing of technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures we are learning to defeat the tactics of our adversaries and increasing the survivability of our Service members. Our transformational work with private industry to experiment with emerging technologies promises to break new ground in this vital endeavor. Thank you for helping us provide the best possible protective equipment for our troops.

Taking care of our troops and their families also means taking care of our wounded. During World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm twenty-four to thirty percent of Americans injured in combat eventually died from their wounds. Today, due to tremendous improvements in our military medical system, nine of ten troops wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan survive. This dramatic improvement is the direct

result of the hard work of our Forward Surgical Teams and Combat Support Hospitals, and the rapid evacuation of the seriously wounded to higher level care facilities in the United States. In Vietnam, it took forty-five days on average to return wounded back to the United States. It now takes four days or less.

Our remarkable medical professionals return to duty over half of our wounded in less than seventy-two hours. Advances in medicine, technology, and rehabilitation techniques enable us to provide much better care for those more seriously wounded. We make every attempt to bring willing Service members back to duty—or return them to society empowered to continue to make a difference. Congressional funding for this effort is greatly appreciated. In particular, thank you for your support for our two new Advanced Amputee Training Centers—at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, here in our Nation's capital, and Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

#### CONCLUSION

I testify before you today with tremendous pride in the bravery, sacrifice and performance of today's Armed Forces. Around the world, in every climate, and often far from home and family, America's men and women in uniform are making a difference. They do so willingly and unflinchingly—volunteers all. Their valor and heroism are awe inspiring and they serve this nation superbly, as have so many who have gone before them. It is an honor to serve alongside them.

The past year saw the U.S. Armed Forces engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan while we also provided humanitarian assistance to victims of the Asian tsunami, hurricanes along the U.S. gulf coast, and the earthquake in Pakistan. There are likely equal challenges and opportunities ahead for the U.S. Armed Forces. The imperatives to defend our homeland, defeat global terrorism, and transform for the future remain. With your continuing support, our military stands ready for the challenges and opportunities ahead.

Thank you for your unwavering support in time of war.

Senator STEVENS. Let me resume my questioning, and then—

Mr. Secretary, we understand that there has been a particular increase, a growth, in problems and in cost of the satellite programs. And there have been some suggested changes presented by Air Force Secretary Wynne and Under Secretary Segal. I don't—some of them are classified, but can you tell us, are these steps going to slow down this rate of growth and—do you believe the Department has that under control now?

#### SATELLITE PROGRAMS

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would be reluctant to say that it's under control. My experience in the space business, both the intelligence side and the Air Force side, is that there has been, over time, a cost growth in those programs. I think there may be some reasons for that. One reason might be the fact that, for many years, as the Department of Defense and the intelligence community moved into these areas, they put in a factor—of some percentage—that reflected the reality, and their realization, that it was very difficult for them to calculate precisely when they were on the cutting edge and reaching into new areas. And, as a result, once that factor was taken out, whatever that percentage was, there tended to be a fairly regular pattern of cost growth or increases over what had been projected. Part of it is because it's new technologies. It is a difficult task. And I would be happy to take a look at some of the numbers and supply something for the record, unless, Tina, you want to comment.

Ms. JONAS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, one of the satellite systems that has had some difficulty has been the—

Senator STEVENS. Pull the mike towards you, please.



Ms. JONAS [continuing]. Has been the SBIRS-High program. There are funds in the budget, of \$700 million, for that, and I will tell you that Under Secretary Krieg and Under Secretary Cambone were just out this weekend and the other day on a review of that. So, I do know that, particularly Under Secretary Krieg, who is the head of the acquisition technology area, is—this is very much in his oversight. He's very attentive to this area. And he's quite active in it, sir.

Senator STEVENS. My last question, Mr. Secretary, would be—you mentioned the updating of the security forces and Iraq's own forces. We're told now that compared to September 2005, when there were 2 brigades, 19 battalions, the Iraqi security forces now have two divisions, 14 brigades, and 57 battalions. What is the goal? I mean, where do you think they would have to be, to be in control?

#### PROGRESS IN IRAQ

Secretary RUMSFELD. The target that exists today is from the prior government, and it is to go up to a total of 325,000 Iraqi security forces, when you take into account the ministry of defense and the ministry of interior forces, but do not include infrastructure protective services, or personal protective services for the people in the country. Whether the new government will stick with the 325,000 ceiling target that they have, I don't know. Until the minister of defense is appointed, which should be this week or next week, we won't have had the chance to talk with these new ministers and discuss that. But every single week and every month, the progress is going forward. And more real estate is being turned over, more bases are being turned over, more responsibilities are being turned over to the Iraqi security forces.

I will say this. The new Prime Minister-designate has been very firm in all the negotiations thus far, that the minister of defense and the minister of interior must be a person who is competent, must be a person who is willing to govern from the center and not take a sectarian view to it.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.

For Members of the subcommittee, Senator Inouye and I have discussed, and we've decided on, a limit of 7 minutes per Senator. There are—we expect 9 to 10 Senators during this period. I hope that's agreeable.

I'll yield to my colleague and co-chairman for 7 minutes.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, the lead story in every network news and major papers reported that the intelligence community was monitoring U.S. telephone service through what is known as data mining. Now, I don't wish to get into the specifics, but apparently it was authorized under the auspices of the Director of National Intelligence. But because of the rumors and allegations that seem to be spreading around, can you assure this subcommittee that the Department of Defense is not conducting any of its own domestic data mining activities, to collect the records of U.S. citizens, or monitoring phone calls?

## DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, let me respond this way. There are several things that have been discussed in this general category. One was the one you mentioned, which is the one that was authorized by the President, the National Security Agency (NSA), approved by the Attorney General, where Members of Congress were briefed from appropriate committees. And that is a separate set of activities which the administration believes are perfectly legal, and that appropriate consultation with Congress has taken place.

There is a second category of activities. And I think they were called the "Talon"——

General PACE. Yes, sir.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Activity. And that involves the fact that the Department of Defense has the principal responsibility for providing force protection for our forces, in the United States and overseas. And, in that process, as they do observation of people observing military facilities, that could conceivably constitute a threat to those facilities, they gather information.

The person who oversees that is Dr. Steve Cambone. When an issue came up about it, he immediately instigated an investigation of it, determined that some of the data should not have been retained, because it was not relevant, and, in one particular case, it had been some information that had been actually gathered by a different department, the Department of Homeland Security, sent to the Department of Defense, because it seemed to be relevant. It turns out it was not relevant, and he has instituted new procedures so that unnecessary information of that type is not retained in the files of the Department of Defense. However, we are clearly continuing to provide force protection to our forces here and elsewhere around the world, as we must.

Senator INOUE. I realize this is a very difficult problem, but we'll have to work on it.

Mr. Secretary, we have had many dozens of boards, blue ribbon panels, commissions, examine the issue of defense acquisition. However, it still takes a long time, about 20 years, to produce an F-22 or V-22. Ships continue to have projected cost overruns. And we're still procuring, basically, for the Army, the same equipment it was purchasing in 1981. What can we do to help you to resolve this problem, or is that the way it's going to be done?

## ACQUISITION PROCESS

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I wish I had a good answer, Senator. As we've watched the acquisition process over 40, 50 years, we've seen that it takes longer and longer to produce and manufacture and procure a weapons system. And we've seen that the costs tend to be greater than those projected. And all of that's been happening at a time when technologies have been, in fact, advancing at a much greater rate. Under the Moore's Law that computer power will double every 18 months, and technologies advance very rapidly, one would think that our capabilities and our technologies within the defense establishment would have to advance at a similar pace. Instead, just the opposite's happening.

There have been so many studies—you could sink a battleship with the acquisition studies. We've got very talented people working on it. We've had talented, interested people in the Congress working with it. There have been outside organizations and studies. I wish I could say that we can be assured that that process will improve.

I do think that one thing good has happened, and that's the concept of spiral development, where you reach in and bring forward some of the technologies that would otherwise have to be delayed until you had completed the entire acquisition of that weapons system. And, to the extent you bring forward those advances in technology, it mitigates some of the delays that will occur with respect to major weapons systems.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Secretary, every year this subcommittee is told that the Defense Health Program is underfunded—we've heard this in hearings and private meetings—while the costs of providing healthcare to our servicemembers and their families continue to rise. Your budget assumes \$735 million in savings from increased fees in the Defense Health Program. However, since the House and Senate Armed Services Committees restricted the Department from implementing these changes, how are you going to absorb these shortfalls?

#### DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, we're hopeful that the Congress will not do that. As you point out, healthcare costs for the Department have at least doubled in the last 5 years, from \$19 billion to \$38 billion, and the design of the system is such that there will not be constraints. It will continue to be unconstrained. And it will continue—if the healthcare costs in the society go up the way they have, it will continue to eat into our other needs.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace, and his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, have spent a lot of time on this. And I'd like General Pace to comment, if I may.

General PACE. Sir, we did look very hard at the healthcare program. The healthcare program that you all enacted in 1995 for servicemembers was a very, very good program, and we want to protect the benefits of that. The premiums had not changed since 1995, and the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs was that we re-norm today's fees to the 1995 levels.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But in the—

Senator INOUE. Thank—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Event that Congress stays with where it looks like it's heading, we'll end up with at least \$735 million that we'll have to cut out of force structure or modernization or some other portion of the budget, because we simply will have no choice. And we need the flexibility we requested, and we need the additional authorization we requested.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Out of deference to the ranking member of the full committee and the senior Member of the Senate, we'll yield, to Senator Byrd, 7 minutes.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, today's hearing could not come at a more important time. In addition to having troops deployed in large numbers to Iraq and Afghanistan, the President recently proposed a new mission for our National Guard, to assist in securing our borders. I have been a strong voice on border security. I have offered nine amendments in the last 5 years to train and deploy thousands of new border patrol agents. Regrettably, the administration opposed all of my amendments, asserting that the spending for border security was extraneous, unnecessary, spending that would expand the size of Government. If we had spent that money beginning in 2002, we would not today be calling on the National Guard. This latest proposal to send troops to the border should not distract from the administration's consistent record of opposing my amendments to tighten our borders.

This hearing is also an opportunity to ask questions about what is going on in Iraq, the cost of the war, this spiraling out of control. We still don't have answers to the most basic questions about the war. How much more is this war going to cost? When is this mission really going to be accomplished? How much longer until our troops start coming home?

The President said in his speech on Monday that the National Guard would be deployed to the border to perform missions like building fences, barricades, and roads. Wouldn't it make more sense to have the Department of Homeland Security contract this work to the private sector and allow the National Guard to preserve its readiness to respond to natural disasters and its other traditional missions? How about that, Mr. Secretary?

#### BORDER SECURITY

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Byrd, the proposal, as I understand it, is for the Department of Homeland Security to, on a very accelerated basis, increase its size and capability to deal with the border security issues. On an interim basis—up to 2 years, is my understanding—the President is proposing that the National Guard assist the Border Patrol, not in law enforcement, and not in arresting people, but doing the kinds of things you mentioned in your remarks. It seems to me that it will not, in any way, degrade or damage the National Guard's capabilities. We're talking about up to 6,000 the first year, and up to 3,000 the second year, out of a National Guard and Reserve component of 400,000 plus people.

Second, the intention is for us not to activate the Guard and deploy them, as we do to Bosnia or Kosovo or Iraq or wherever, but, rather, to use their 2-week active duty for training, as we have been doing in support of the counternarcotics mission along the border for some time, and as we currently do, for example, with respect to hurricane damage and other activities. So, we believe the large portion of the individuals will be doing it on their active duty for training, and it will be beneficial to the Guard, because they'll be doing the very same things they would be doing if they were training their 2 weeks on an exercise basis, as opposed to doing something that the country really needs.

Senator BYRD. Well, I don't think I've heard the answer to my question. Wouldn't it make more sense to have the Department of Homeland Security contract its work to the private sector and

allow the National Guard to preserve its readiness to respond to natural disasters and its other traditional missions?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think that it does make sense for the Department of Homeland Security to use its own assets, as well as its contracting authorities, to do the things that it's appropriate for them to do. What the President's proposing is for the National Guard to provide some assistance with respect to some of those activities, on an interim basis, as the Department of Homeland Security ramps up to a greater level of capability.

Senator BYRD. Do you intend, Mr. Secretary, to deploy National Guardsmen from West Virginia and other non-border States?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Byrd, the plan, as I understand it—we have General Blum here, who will be deeply involved in it—the plan is this, that first the four border States involved—California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas—would use their own National Guard people to the extent they have the skill sets needed to support the Border Patrol. Second, the National Guard Bureau would then advise the State Governors, who would be in charge of these forces, where in the country those skill sets that are still needed exist, and then they would work out arrangements with those States. And to the extent a State Governor did not want to—for example, if West Virginia decided they did not want to participate, they would not participate. To the extent States would like to, on a reciprocal basis, which States demonstrated they do like to do, and are willing to do—and thank goodness they were, in Katrina; we went from zero to 50,000 guardspeople down in that area in a week or two—then General Blum would direct those States to some other State to make that request. Is that roughly right?

General BLUM. Mr. Secretary, you have it exactly correct. Senator Byrd, this is building on a long-lasting, time-proven model. If you remember, right after 9/11, when the Guard was put into the airports of this Nation until Transportation Security Administration could recruit and train enough people to take over that niche. The Guard provided that capability for this Nation on an interim basis until the proper Federal agency could stand up, train, and equip their people. They then took over the mission, the Guard left that mission and went back to being—doing other things. We did the same thing on the Southwest border with the cargo handling inspection mission. The National Guard, for several years, was on the Southwest border inspecting cargo until we could get the Customs people to get their own cargo inspectors recruited, trained, and equipped. Then, the National Guard came off of that mission.

It would be my intent to work the National Guard out of this mission as quickly as the Department of Homeland Security can stand up their capabilities. What Secretary Rumsfeld said about the partnership of the States with the Federal Government on this, and the autonomy and the control of the Governors of their National Guard forces will remain in affect.

To me, sir, I think the National Guard is superbly ready to be the military force of choice for this interim mission, until the Department of Homeland Security can stand up and assume this mission on their own.

Senator BYRD. General, my time is running out. Let me ask you, how do we know that these deployments won't detract from the ability of guardsmen to respond to emergencies in their home States?

General BLUM. Sir, that is a commitment that I pledge to the Secretary of Defense and the Governors of this Nation. We have a very robust force of 445,000 citizen soldiers and airmen. We will leverage the joint capabilities out of the Air National Guard. We have sufficient soldiers to do the overseas warfight, prepare for the upcoming hurricane season, and still have the forces that we need to respond for terrorism in this country, or a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. As the Secretary said, the high-end limit of 6,000, only represents a little less than 2 percent of our available force, and I think we can manage that. If any State has a particular issue or problem, and cannot send their forces, we have many, many other choices that we can make, sir.

Senator STEVENS. The Senator's time has expired. I'm sorry.

Senator BYRD. Very well.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Bond is recognized for 7 minutes.

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I was encouraged to hear your comments about the coordination, the defense intelligence, and the rest of the intelligence community. And I believe it was indirectly referenced by—Chairman Pace. Clearly, we found, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, that we had a long way to go. And we look forward to that progress. We hope we can get Michael Hayden confirmed as head of the Central Intelligence Agency and move forward in that. I know that generally, your intelligence responsibilities are tactical; whereas, the other agencies have more strategic plans. That's not a hard-and-fast dichotomy, but it is one where there needs to be full communication both ways, in terms of both of those missions.

Well, as you are well aware from questions and from our discussions, many of us on this committee and in the Senate are concerned that the Guard has been pushed around in policy and budget decisions within the Pentagon. And, Mr. Secretary, clearly we feel that needs to change. When the Guard's given a mission, the Guard's there to do the job, whether it's Iraq, Afghanistan, or Katrina. But too often when critical decisions were made that impacted them, the Guard leaders were shut out.

As you know, 75 of us wrote to urge the Pentagon not to reduce the National Guard end strength, in December. But I have found it very troubling that the—there was—when the Quadrennial Defense Review came out, as you noted in your preface, quote, "In the pages that followed, the Department's senior leadership sets out where the Department of Defense currently is and the direction we believe it needs to go in fulfilling our responsibilities to the American people. Now, in the fifth year of this global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change leading to victory," close quotes.

Well, that sounds good, but we understand that the Guard was not at the discussion—not even at the discussion table. Now, we do know—I have been advised that, in this latest mission, assigned by the President to the Guard, the Guard was fully involved. And

that's why the Guard has been able to adapt, and will use normal training times. And I think this is the way it should work.

I also appreciate very much your encouraging words about the resourcing and support of the Guard. But I guess my first question would be, Can you explain how the Pentagon can develop a roadmap for change leading to victory with a key strategic partner in the total force, the National Guard, not even at the—in the discussions, or even at the discussion table?

General PACE. Sir, may I respond—

Senator BOND. General.

General PACE [continuing]. Because I was at—I was at the table, as was General Blum.

The process that you all have set out through recent legislation that allows the head of the National Guard Bureau to wear three stars, to have two-star officers on my staff, one representing the Guard, one representing the Reserves, worked extremely well during the QDR. During the QDR process, General Blum and my two general officers were at the table. So, it was not the QDR, sir, that got off track.

What happened was, near the end of the QDR process, but separate from it, during a budget analysis that the Army did in November, that's when the Guard was not at the initial meetings, and that's when all this misinformation about how many troops, how much money, et cetera, took place. General Blum can speak for himself as to whether or not he believes he was properly represented. I was there at all those meetings. It is true that, came the time for making budget decisions, that the first meeting or two did not have enough representation. That was quickly corrected by the Army. But then what happened was, all the rumors that were out there, about  $x$  number of people being cut, et cetera, took on a life of their own.

At the end of the day, the only thing that was ever presented to the Secretary of Defense from the QDR and from the budget process was that the authority would be for 350,000, that there were currently 333,000, and that, rather than put the money in the budget for the other 17,000, that that money would be reallocated inside the Army budget as the recruiting force was successful in getting those other 17,000, sir.

Senator BOND. General, I'm sure we're going to hear from General Blum in a minute, but let me ask, When the—the way the military works when there are a bunch of—when there are four stars sitting at a table, do—does a three-star general have equal footing in that discussion?

General PACE. Sir, you bet, if he's representing something as strong and as solid as the National Guard. Three stars, majors, whoever it is who's representing and has a knowledge base is what we're looking for. I'm not looking around the table counting stars; I'm looking around the table for the expertise.

Senator BOND. General Blum, I guess I was misinformed. Have you been fully involved in all of the participations in all of these plans?

General BLUM. Sir, you have not been misinformed. What General Pace said is exactly accurate. I think it was a perfect record of what happened in the QDR, and then what didn't happen at the

end of the QDR, that really was not QDR, it was really budget and programming decisions that had to be made. At that time, frankly—and I've told this subcommittee, and I've told others—that I was not consulted, at that particular time. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the Staff of Army have come in here and told this subcommittee, in their own words, that that part could have been done better. They are committed—and certainly this Secretary and this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, are committed—to not repeating the long and sordid past that the Guard has had with its parent services. They're committed—

Senator BOND. General—

General BLUM [continuing]. To a different path.

Senator BOND [continuing]. I'm about to run out of time, excuse me, but I just wanted to point out that the Government Accountability Office, in talking about Katrina, said that poor planning and confusion about the military's role contributed to problems after the storm struck on August 29, and, without immediate attention, improvement is unlikely. And was the Guard not fully involved in the planning for the Guard's response? What happened?

General BLUM. Are you talking about for the hurricane response—

Senator BOND. Katrina.

General BLUM [continuing]. To Katrina? I sat with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the acting Secretary of Defense from the very beginning of that—it was Secretary England, because Secretary Rumsfeld was out of the country when Katrina first hit. They were fully aware of everything that the Guard was doing, total transparency. We, in fact, did have a very prominent voice at the table during that entire process, and it worked magnificently well as a result—that piece.

Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. One National Guard question, and then I'd like to talk about Iraq. According to recent testimony of the chief of the Border Patrol, the Border Patrol currently has 11,300 people. If I understand posse comitatus correctly, the Guard, under Federal control, is restricted to logistics and support services. If there are 11,300 Border Patrol officers, how many support and logistical jobs are there that Border Patrol can be freed up from?

#### BORDER SECURITY

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I'm told that an analysis is being completed, and is supposed to be submitted to the Department of Homeland Security this afternoon. And, at that point, they will come to the Department of Defense—and, particularly, General Blum—and say, "Here are the things we would like to backfill or the additional things we would like done, some additional UAVs or some additional technical support or language support or construction support." And then, there'll be a matching of those capabilities. Is that right?

General BLUM. I think that's a very accurate description, Mr. Secretary—Senator.



Senator FEINSTEIN. Yeah. Because one of my big concerns is, we have doubled the Guard since 1995. Apprehensions at the border have gone down 31 percent. Apprehensions inland have gone down 36 percent. And the flow has continued. Something is problematic, in my view. But if you have 11,000 active Border Patrol—I've been trying to find out how many logistical and support positions there are, but I suspect they should be far below 6,000. And so, I will just leave you with that.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. Yeah, I don't know, but I think you're probably correct.

I mean, I'll give you one example of something that we can do. There is a training range in Arizona that has a 37-mile border with Mexico. And in the last year, something like 15 percent of the training time, down near Yuma, we lost, because of immigrants coming across that border, and it was too dangerous to use it. There have been people who have died out there from not enough water or food, who were misled as to the distances they'd have to go. So, from a humanitarian standpoint, from a training standpoint, and from an illegal immigration standpoint, we could go to work, for example, and do the kind of fencing, that's been done in other parts of that border, in our training range, and advantage everybody by doing it.

Now, that is not something that would be replacing something that the Border Patrol is currently doing, but it would be a very useful thing to do——

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. We believe, or at least we're looking——

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. At it.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I understand.

Let's turn to Iraq for a minute. As I understand the situation—and I know you'll correct me if I'm wrong—the Prime Minister has until May 21 to appoint the Minister of Defense. They are wrangling. If he doesn't meet that time deadline, my understanding of the constitution is that the Prime Minister is replaced. Is that your understanding?

#### IRAQI GOVERNMENT FORMATION

Secretary RUMSFELD. My understanding, as of this morning, is that he has made a decision with respect to the Minister of Defense, that there are two open ministries. I think they're—one is Ministry of Interior, and the other may be finance or oil—do you recall?

General PACE. Yes, sir. That's finance, sir.

Secretary RUMSFELD.—Finance——

General PACE. Yes, sir.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. That are still being debated, and that the hope or expectation is that, by the deadline, they will make an announcement.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good.

It's my understanding that both you and General Pace have expressed a desire to see a reduction of United States troops in Iraq from our current level, but you've stated this can't take place until

a permanent cabinet is formed and that any downsizing would be based on the security situation on the ground and the readiness of Iraqi security forces. Could you provide this subcommittee with your personal assessment of where things stand with respect to downsizing the American troop presence, in terms of the security situation, the training of Iraqi security forces, and political developments? I'd be interested in what must happen, in your view, before we begin a major downsizing of the American troop presence in Iraq.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, we supply the Congress, I think, every quarter, a report that responds to that, in the broad sense. And it would reflect, I'm sure—General Pace's staff and I both go over it——

General PACE. We do.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. And it reflects our best judgment at that moment.

If General Casey were here, he would say that there must be good—reasonable security, there must be a reasonable economic opportunity; and, to have either one, you've got to have a unity government. So, you're not going to get the security that's needed, in my—in his view, unless the new government engages the country, has a reconciliation process, and proceeds in demonstrating to the Iraqi people that they have a stake in the success of that government.

Now, that's general. The second key thing, obviously, is, how many Iraqi security forces are there going to be, and how good are they, and how fast can they take over that responsibility? And we know what that trajectory is.

Senator FEINSTEIN. I think the point is—of many of us—and let me just speak for myself—is that we have reached a point, in Iraq, of major sectarian violence. If I had to take a guess, I am very worried about Muqtada al-Sadr, the Medhi militia, what's happening in the development. And the American presence becomes a kind of scapegoat for the militias to carry out operations against other civilians.

I am really concerned about our people being caught in the middle of this. And it seems to me that the time is upon us to transition that mission and begin to confine our presence to logistics and support, and move our people out.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, we—I don't disagree with the construct that you've presented. We ought to be worried about Sadr and his militia. Armed militias, in a country of democracy, are inconsistent with the success of that democracy. And the new government, I will say, the Prime Minister-designate, one of the first things he did was say, "We're going to have to address the militia issue publicly." Second thing he did is, he went down and saw Sistani, the leading cleric in the country, and got him to say that the issue of militias has to be addressed. So, there's broad agreement with that point.

The second thing I agree with is that, you're quite right, General Abizaid and General Casey wrestle every day with the tension that you described, the tension between having too few forces so that the political process can't go forward, and having so many forces and being so intrusive that you contribute to the insurgency and

feed the argument that we're the problem. And so, it's an art, not a science. They're terribly competent individuals, and it varies from different section of the country to different section. It also, as you suggested, varies depending on the role that you're playing. If you're more in the background, less patrols, more in support, in the combat support, combat service support, quick-reaction forces, Medicare—medical evacuation capability, those kinds of things are less intrusive than patrols.

And so, you have exactly described what General Abizaid and General Casey are wrestling with.

General PACE. And, Senator, the turnover process continues. We had 110 facilities the beginning of this year. We're down to—we turned over 34, or closed—turned over or closed a total of 34, down to 76. And for the rest of this year we're going to close probably another 20 plus, or turn over. The Iraqi divisions, there are 10. They are building—two of them currently are in the lead. The other eight are building capacity to go in the lead. Their brigades are over 30. Fifteen of those brigades are in the lead, meaning they have territory they control. They are building to 120 infantry battalions, of which currently—65 currently are in the lead and on the ground.

So, as this political process continues, so does the turnover responsibility for more and more of the territory of the country, sir—ma'am.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you.

I've exceeded my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, the Air Force currently has an aging fleet of refueling tankers that are already experiencing problems. Given the age, the reliability issues, and maintenance challenges facing the current tanker fleet, the timely replacement of the KC-135s should be a priority of the Department of Defense. Could you give us your thoughts on how soon the Department is going to execute the new program? And how are we going to recapitalize the tanker fleet before the age issue and the recapitalization issue becomes too critical?

#### TANKER RECAPITALIZATION

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the last I heard, the request for information is out, the draft request for proposal is expected to be out in September of this year. And if things work out properly, it should end up with a formal request for proposals by January 2007.

Senator SHELBY. Isn't this very important to the Air Force?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is. And the Air Force clearly is interested in it, and addressing it. If that timeframe persists and doesn't get moved to the right, that would suggest a contract award in sometime late of 2007—fiscal year 2007, so it would be, you know, in the third quarter of next year.

Senator SHELBY. But it's going to happen, is it not? Is that what you're saying?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Air Force is determined that it happen, and that it be done in a proper and orderly way.

Senator SHELBY. It is a priority for you, Secretary of Defense?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is.

Senator SHELBY. One of your priorities?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. I mean, if you think of what we have to do in the world, we simply—

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Have to have a competent, capable, ready tanker fleet. And we have to get about the task, over time, of seeing that the aging of that fleet is arrested.

General PACE. Sir, and there's lead money in the 2007 request for the first three aircraft that will allow us to, in fact, get on about building the airplanes, if, in fact, the contract is awarded.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, General.

Mr. Secretary, the joint cargo aircraft, just the subject, there's—we've been—a lot of us have been closely following the Joint Air—Cargo Aircraft Program. And a lot of us are concerned that the recent decision to transition the Army future cargo aircraft into a joint Army/Air Force program is delaying the Army's needed replacement of the organic fixed-wing cargo lift that it needs. There's some discussion that it's the Air Force's lack of urgency here that led to the Senate Armed Services Committee, as you know, recently cutting the authorization for the joint cargo aircraft in the 2007 budget. Ironically, all the money was taken from the Army's account there. Do you support, Mr. Secretary, the urgency of the Army's organic airlift requirement and the need to fully fund the joint aircraft—joint cargo aircraft in 2007?

General PACE, you want to address that?

General PACE. Senator, thank you. I am not knowledgeable about a problem with the Army's joint cargo aircraft.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

General PACE. All of our focus has been on getting the Army moved overseas, and that focus has been on the C-17 and the C-5 fleet.

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely.

General PACE. A very robust mobility capability study we've just completed determined that 180 C-17s and 112 C-5s was the right mix and that would allow us to do our business. I will have to get back to you, sir, with any particular problem at a lower level than that.

Senator SHELBY. Of course, we're interested in the Sherpa's replacement, you know, in a timely fashion—

General PACE. Aye, sir.

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. As you know. Can you get back with me on that?

General PACE. I will. I don't have the facts in my head.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

[The information follows:]

The Administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request included \$109.2 million in Aircraft Procurement, Army for the procurement of three Future Cargo Aircraft. I support this request. If funds are not made available for this request, it will delay Army platform fielding and replacement of their existing fixed wing logistics aircraft. The Army's Future Cargo Aircraft fills a Joint Requirements Oversight Coun-

cil (JROC) validated capability gap and has Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) level endorsement as part of the Army's Aviation Modernization Program.

Senator SHELBY. The joint common missile. We've talked about that before here, and, of course, there was a decision in 2004, a Presidential budget decision to terminate that, although a lot of people believe it's a remarkably healthy, low-risk program. It was on schedule, on budget, successfully demonstrating important new capabilities for the warfighter. Can you give us a status report, General Pace or Mr. Secretary, on where the joint common missile stands, in terms of cost, performance, and schedule? What's going on here?

General PACE. Sir, the joint common missile was a item of great discussion during the QDR. It was fed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee's deliberations, looked at the Nation's total needs for precision weapons. The Hellfire II, the laser-guided bombs, the joint directed TAC munitions all were assessed as providing for this Nation, the amount of precision munitions needed for the perceived warfights. Therefore, the munition that you're speaking about was recommended to be taken out of the budget so we could apply that \$3 billion plus to other programs that were more needed than it, sir.

Senator SHELBY. What happened to the \$30 million that was appropriated by this subcommittee last year that the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) withheld, do you know, Mr. Secretary? Can you get back with us on that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't have that in my head. Do you, Tina?

Ms. JONAS. Mr. Shelby, we will check, for the record, for you. My understanding, at this moment, is that it has not yet been spent, but we'll certainly—

Senator SHELBY. Yeah, it's—

Ms. JONAS [continuing]. Will check, for the record, sir.

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. Been withheld, and we just wondered why it had not been spent.

Ms. JONAS. Yes, sir.

Senator SHELBY. Will you get back with me on that?

Ms. JONAS. We certainly will, sir.

Senator SHELBY. Yeah. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The \$30 million appropriated for Joint Common Missile in fiscal year 2006 is currently being withheld by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as this weapon is a terminated program. Congressional report language encourages the Department to reevaluate this decision, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is studying the requirements for this type of close air support.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General Pace, always good to see you. Always good to see all of you—General Blum. Some of these questions, I'd like to follow up.

I listened to Senator Feinstein's question on Iraq. I get increasingly worried about that, that the—we just seem to have a policy of "more of the same." The struggle to form a government goes on interminably. The President says there's a workable strategy in

place that will allow for a significant troop withdrawal this year. But, since he said that, we've seen a huge rise in ethnic violence, the proliferation of militias that seem out of control, certainly a lengthening of the American casualty roster. Beyond that, it's anybody's guess how many Iraqis have been killed or injured.

American taxpayers get the bill of over \$1 billion a week. The meter is just running on and on. Former Senator from Illinois, Senator Dirksen, once said, "That kind of money adds up." Now we're planning a \$1 billion Embassy, the most expensive Embassy any country has ever built anywhere. And we're planning that at the same time we're saying we're not there to control anything. And then we build bases that are going to be the envy of military in most countries. Are we still going to see a significant troop withdrawal this year?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator——

Senator LEAHY. I know that's—I know that question surprised you, Mr. Secretary.

#### TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Secretary RUMSFELD. No, indeed, it didn't. Needless to say, we would hope so. And, as the President said, he will wait to receive the recommendations from General Casey and General Abizaid and General Pace as to what they believe the conditions on the ground will permit. And as you continue to go up in Iraqi security forces, both in numbers and equipment and experience, we are being successful in transferring more and more responsibility to them, which, if they get a government, a unity government, and if the government is persuasive to the people of Iraq that they should have a stake in its success, then we ought to be able to make a reduction.

Senator LEAHY. Well, let me ask you this——

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me just make a comment, though, on your "interminable"—you said it was "interminable," what was going on.

Senator LEAHY. Well, let me——

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me——

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Let me——

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me just quickly respond. We go from election, November 4—this is a country with 250 years experience with democracy, and we go from an election, November 4, and then it goes December, January, and the president's sworn in, and then the cabinet gets sworn in, in February and March, after confirmation.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary RUMSFELD. I mean, it's not much difference from——

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Secretary, we're——

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. What we're doing, but they've never done it before.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Secretary, we're not——

Secretary RUMSFELD. They're breaking new ground.

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. We're not having sectarian violence in the streets all the time——

Secretary RUMSFELD. True.

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Either. And we have spent billions of dollars. We have rosy scenarios all the time. Is there any significant section of Iraq that the Iraqis could control the law and order with civil government, with the—with necessary services, without U.S. involvement?

General PACE. Sir, there are 14 of the 18 provinces right now that are essentially calm, secure——

Senator LEAHY. So, we can withdraw from those 14.

General PACE. To complete my answer to your question, sir, we are still in the process of assisting their armed forces in getting these skills they need. We have the battalions coming online—as I mentioned, 120 that are being built, 65 in the lead. There are still the logistics and command and control parts of their army that need to be built, for them to be able to sustain themselves completely. So, in those areas where they are currently in the lead on the ground, we are assisting them with logistics and command and control, and, over time, we are building that capacity for them, as well.

Senator LEAHY. General, in those 14, are there any one of them that the U.S. forces can withdraw completely in the next 3 months?

General PACE. No, sir.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

It's been almost—Mr. Secretary, it's been almost like clockwork since September 11 that the National Guard is called up to carry out homeland security or disaster relief functions. And I think both you and I would join in praise of the way they have performed. They have been used to increase security at the Nation's airports, here at the Capitol after 9/11, and when I came to work, and thousands of others proudly came to work in this Capitol Building, just as thousands went proudly to work in the Pentagon, which was struck, we saw the Guard out here. They were at the Olympics, on the border, and then, after the Department of Homeland Security failed miserably after Katrina, they responded there and serving under the title 32 status on control of the Nation's Government.

Now, I think it's the right way to call out the Guard in the United States, but it requires sensitivity to the needs of the State, adequate communication with the Nation's Governors. You've been asked this question by Senator Bond and others, and you and I have discussed this privately. It really seems, to me, that, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they—the highest advisory body to you and the Joint Chiefs, that you would be well served to have the chief of the Guard Bureau on this board. I referenced, when you and I were coming back on a flight from New York, that, when I raised that, there was an enormous amount of turbulence inside the airplane. It was very smooth flying outside.

Have you had any change in your thought after you heard from Senator Bond, myself, and probably about 40 other Senators?

#### NATIONAL GUARD

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Leahy, I have reflected on your recommendation in that regard, and I've talked to Pete Pace and other members of the Chiefs——

Senator LEAHY. I know you reflect on a lot I say. Go ahead.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. And I guess the short answer is, no, I've not found myself migrating over to your viewpoint on that particular issue. I think the way we look at it is that the Army includes the total Army; and the Air Force, the total Air Force; and that to begin to segment them inside the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a good idea. And the Guard and the Reserves have to be well represented in the Joint Chiefs, and we have to assure that we have those linkages that work and are effective. But to begin taking segments of the Army or the Navy, the Air Force or the marines, and add them in, I think, is not the best idea.

Pete?

General PACE. Sir, we worked real hard for the last 20 years, under the leadership of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, to kluge together a joint force. And we have one Army, one Navy, one Air Force, one Marine Corps, and they are working extremely well together now. To divide our Air Force, to divide our Army by having an additional member of the Joint Chiefs, who represents a segment of both of those services, would do a disservice to the country. That does not mean that we do not need to have a robust representation of the Guard. And this committee and the Congress, in recent legislation, increased the rank, to three stars, of Lieutenant General Blum's position, gave the chairman two two-star positions, both of which are filled by quality officers. I recommend, from the standpoint of the rank structure, that we look to the commission that Mr. Punaro is heading, to take a look at the entire Guard and Reserve structure, see what responsibilities they have, see how many stars are appropriate, and to see how that might impact the other Reserve and Guard forces. But as far as being a member of the Joint Chiefs, sir, I would find that disruptive, not helpful.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. Obviously, I'll follow up more on this, because I still have the concerns about homeland security.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Senator McConnell, you're recognized for 7 minutes.

Senator MCCONNELL. Mr. Secretary, it strikes me that Members of Congress, and, to some extent, the American people, are having a hard time measuring progress in what has been described as the "long war."

Let me suggest that there are at least two ways that I think we can measure progress. Number one, we haven't been attacked again here at home since 9/11. And, I want to commend you and your Department for that, because I think the only reason that we haven't been attacked again is, we've been on offense, going after the people who would do us harm, where they tend to hang out. Another way to measure progress, it strikes me, is the reduction in the number of states that sponsor terrorism. Qaddafi had an epiphany after witnessing what happened in Iraq, and has been busily trying to normalize his relationship with us. You've got an emerging democracy in Afghanistan, an emerging democracy in Iraq, which we've all been talking about here this morning.

It seems to me that's clearly progress, both in terms of the absence of additional attacks here at home, which we all expected, even later in 2001, not to mention over the next 5 years, and the reduction in the number of states that sponsor terrorism.



I've heard it suggested, Mr. Secretary, that somehow the Middle East is in worst shape as a result of an emerging democracy in Iraq. And I'd be interested in your views about how a process of democratization in Iraq could possibly make things worse in the neighborhood. And, second, I'd like for you to touch on the Iranian influence in Iraq these days, and the extent to which that may be complicating our moving forward there.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I missed that—what the word was, the—about—the second part of your question? I didn't—

Senator MCCONNELL. Well—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Understand the word.

Senator MCCONNELL I'd like your response to the suggestion that somehow the Middle East is worse off as a result of—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator MCCONNELL [continuing]. Of an emerging democracy in Iraq. And, rather than take up your time by asking another question, I went ahead and asked my follow-up question. I'm interested in your observations about the extent to which Iran is exacerbating the problem in Iraq.

#### DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. I think one way to look at the first part of your question is to picture Iraq today, were we to withdraw and the democratic government to fail, and the Zarqawi/al Qaeda people take over that country and turn it into the kind of safe haven that they had in Afghanistan. These are the people who behead people. These are the people that are funding terrorist attacks in other countries. These are the people who would take that country, and, therefore, that part of the world, back to the dark ages. They want to reestablish a caliphate. And the dire consequences for the people of Iraq, the 25 million people—12 million of them went out and voted for their constitution in their democratic election. It is a country that's big, it's important, it has oil, it has water, it has history, and for it to be turned over to extremists would be a terrible thing for that part of the world and for the free world, and for free people everywhere, in my view.

I also would say that if people are concerned about Iran, the thought of having the Iraqi constitution and the sovereign elected government fail there would be the best thing in the world, from Iran's standpoint. And if people are anxious to see Iran successful in the path they're on, it strikes me that tossing in the towel on Iraq would be a boost for them.

The second part of your question is hard for me to answer. We know that Iran has access across that border. It's historic. Shi'a religious sites are in Iraq, and they've been going back and forth on pilgrimages for decades.

We know that we're finding Iranian-manufactured weapons inside of Iraq. We have information that they are engaged in funding segments of that population to try to advantage themselves. Their position clearly cannot be characterized as benign or disinterested. I would characterize it as unhelpful. The problem we've got is, unless you catch somebody from Iran, from the Government of Iran, physically bringing a weapon into Iraq, and you can tie a string be-

tween the two, you can't assert that it necessarily was government sponsored.

Pete, do you want to—

General PACE. Sir, I think you hit it on the nail, sir. And there's more that we could talk about in closed session, sir, but I think that's about all we should say publicly.

Senator MCCONNELL. I was not here at the beginning of the hearing, and I apologize if you've already gotten this question, but I'm curious, since I think we would all agree, everyone in this room, that the quickest ticket out of Iraq is the adequacy of the Iraqi military and police. Has someone given an update on where they stand these days? If not, I would like to hear that.

General PACE. Sir, we gave a partial answer to that question. I can go down it very quickly.

Senator MCCONNELL. All right.

General PACE. We stand, today, at 254,000 total Iraqi security forces, en route to 325,000. Inside the Iraqi army, there are 10 divisions, two of which currently control territory on their own. There are over 30 brigades, 15 of which currently control Iraqi territory on their own. There are 120 battalions, 65 of which currently control property on their own. In Baghdad, for example, just a little bit over half the city now is controlled by Iraqi army and Iraqi police. The Iraqi army is ahead of the Iraqi police with regard to its capacity to stand on its own, because we started with the Iraqi police a little bit later. But the Iraqi police are undergoing the exact same training process, embedded trainers, that we have with the Iraqi army. We are now adding to the Iraqi police, so they are coming along. And the process is on track so that by the end of this year, the vast majority, 95 percent plus, of the Iraqi army will be manned, trained, and equipped and in various stages of capacity, and then later on in 2007, the police will be complete.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would only add this thought, which I believe I mentioned earlier. The success of the Iraqi security forces is impressive. They're making excellent progress. The reality is that unless you have a government formed, and with strong, competent ministers that are going to govern in a nonsectarian manner in those key security ministries, the future of the Iraqi security forces can't be counted on, because they require a government structure above them, and ministries above them, that are capable and competent, so that there are chains of command and civilian control and linkages back to the government. And that's the process that's very close to happening.

Senator MCCONNELL. That's what we expect to happen by Saturday, I gather. We hope.

Senator STEVENS. The Senator's time has expired.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Durbin is recognized for 7 minutes.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Pace.

Mr. Secretary, I've reviewed your testimony before this subcommittee since the invasion of Iraq, and it has been consistent. It consistently tells us the Iraqi forces are better than ever, the time is coming very soon when they will be ready to stand and fight for their own country. And yet, as the years have gone by, despite your

testimony, we still have 135,000 or more American soldiers with their lives on the line. We've lost 2,450 of our best and bravest. Over 20,000 have suffered serious, life-changing injuries and come home. And our Senate has spoken, that this is to be a year of significant transition. I have heard nothing in your testimony, as I've listened to it, as it's been related to me, to suggest that you have plans to make this a year for significant transition in Iraq. Can you tell us that, before the end of this calendar year, a significant number of American troops will be redeployed out of harm's way in Iraq?

#### TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Secretary RUMSFELD. No. No one can. It's obviously our desire, and the desire of the troops, and the desire of the Iraqi people. No one wants foreign forces in their country. The President is the one who will make the decision in the executive branch of the Government. He has said that he's responsive to General Abizaid and General Casey and General Pace's recommendations, and that their recommendations are going to be based on conditions on the ground. We've gone from a high of 160,000. Today we're at about 133,000, I think. We have every hope that we'll be able to continue making reductions as the Iraqi security forces continue to take over responsibility, as General Pace has described they're currently doing.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Secretary, I will believe the statements about the viability and strength of the Iraqi security forces when the first Iraqi soldier stands up and replaces an American soldier. And from what I'm hearing from you, it won't happen this year.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, that's just not correct. I don't know quite what you mean by "replaces an American soldier," but they can—they had the principal responsibility for security for the elections, for the constitutional referendum. They—

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Secretary, the American people want to know when our forces, currently in harm's way in Iraq, are going to be out of harm's way, redeployed to a safe location outside of Iraq. And you've said, "No, it won't happen this year."

Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not. You're not listening carefully. I did not say it will not happen—

Senator DURBIN. Well, speak—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. This year. I—

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. And I will listen carefully.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not say it will not happen this year. I said I hoped it happens this year, but I can't promise it.

Senator DURBIN. Well, when we talk about significant transition, I'm afraid I don't have any evidence of it yet, in terms of—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, there's been—

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Our policy.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. A lot of transition, Senator Durbin. And—maybe you wouldn't characterize it that way, but clearly there's been a shift in weight within the roles that the coalition forces are playing in Iraq away from patrolling and over toward the training and the equipping and the mentoring and the embedded process within, now, not just the ministry of defense

forces, but also the ministry of interior forces. That's—that is a shift. At least I would characterize it. Wouldn't you, General?

General PACE. Sir, there's a continuing process here. We started the beginning of this calendar year with almost 160,000 troops on the ground. We're down to about 133,000, as the Secretary pointed out. We went from almost 20 brigades during the turnover and the election security, down to 15 brigades now. I——

Senator DURBIN. But, General, isn't it true that we ramped up the number of forces for the election?

General PACE. We did, sir. And we're——

Senator DURBIN. And then brought them——

General PACE [continuing]. And we're——

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Back down after the election.

General PACE. We ramped up from 18 to 20, and then we went back down to 17, and then we went down to 15, where we are right now. And about 2 weeks ago, General Casey and General Abizaid recommended to the Joint Chiefs, and we recommended to the Secretary, that we not move the brigade that's currently prepared to deploy from Germany into Iraq right now until we take a look at the current situation on the ground, work with the new government, because it appears that the Iraqi armed forces, having built as much as they have, will be able to take over more. So, they—the Iraqi armed forces are taking over more and more territory. And I can show you a map after—when we're done, sir, that shows you, basically in two colors, how much of the country, which is about 25 percent right now, has been—is under control of Iraqi forces. And about half of Baghdad is in that territory, sir.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, General.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I say one——

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Secretary, I'd—sorry, I have 2½ minutes, and there's one other issue I'd like to touch on, and that relates to the McCain torture amendment, which passed the Senate, 90 to 9. We were hoping that there would be a rewrite of the Army Field Manual consistent with the McCain amendment. And it appears that there have been some problems. I don't understand why. I want to ask you basically this. Do you believe that we should be working toward a consistent, uniform standard when it comes to the treatment, detention, and interrogation of prisoners? And do you believe, as the original Army Field Manual said, that every interrogation technique authorized should be—would be considered lawful—let me restate that. Can you assure us that every interrogation technique authorized by the new Field Manual would be considered lawful by the Pentagon if it was used on captured American servicemembers?

#### TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Secretary RUMSFELD. I'll try to answer. I'm not sure I understand the——

Senator DURBIN. Let me restate it.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Structure of the question.

Senator DURBIN. It wasn't clear, and I want to make sure it is. There's been a question as to whether you're going to make some distinctions in the Army Field Manual in the way we treat prisoners. And the standard that was published in the Army Field

Manual, an unclassified document, was as follows, that we would not employ interrogation technique against prisoners that would be considered unlawful if it were employed against American servicemembers. Will that still be the standard—one single consistent standard?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me try to respond. The Army Field Manual rewrite has been undertaken. It's completed. It's been completed for a number of weeks. I shouldn't say "completed." It has been in a draft form for circulation for a number of weeks. I believe some portions of it have been discussed on the Hill. It is complicated, because of some definitional issues. It clearly is designed to comply with the law. Let there be no doubt about that.

The—part of your question leads me to believe that it goes to the question—

Senator DURBIN. The law—it says there will be one uniform standard. That was the McCain amendment. There were no distinctions. Was that what the Army Field Manual will be recommending?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, if you're asking me, "Will the Army Field Manual be recommending that it be, in every sense, complying with the law?" the answer is, it will.

Senator DURBIN. And the interrogation techniques that will be included would be interrogation techniques which we would find lawful if they were used on American servicemembers?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah, I am not a lawyer, as you know, and the reason I started to respond to that part of the question is, there is a debate over the difference between a prisoner of war, under the Geneva Convention, and an unlawful combatant, in a situation that is different from the situation envisioned by the Geneva Convention. And those issues are being wrestled with at the present time, but you can have every confidence that the Army Field Manual, which is, as far as I'm concerned, almost ready to come out, will be seen as, and, in fact, be, consistent with U.S. law.

Senator STEVENS. The time has expired—

Senator DURBIN. Thank you.

Senator STEVENS [continuing]. Senator.

Senator Specter, recognized for 7 minutes.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, has there been any objection by the Department of Defense to the format of the defense appropriations bill with respect to earmarks?

#### EARMARKS

Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess sometimes beauty is in the eye of the beholder. I can express, not a departmental view, because it hasn't been coordinated, but, to the extent that billions of dollars are taken out of things that we recommended, and to the extent things are proscribed from our doing them—for example, with respect to the military healthcare programs—and that we're restricted with respect to transfer funds and reprogramming in a manner that's harmful, then, obviously, it's inconsistent with what we recommended and the President recommended.

Senator SPECTER. Do you think—

Secretary RUMSFELD. And—

Senator SPECTER [continuing]. Do you think—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Once money is taken away from one thing and put into something else—we wanted it where we recommended. On the other hand, the Congress's Article I of the Constitution, and the President proposes, and the Congress disposes. And——

Senator SPECTER. Well, that was my next question. Do you think Congress has an appropriate role in the designation of earmarks?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I obviously think Congress has an appropriate role. The way the Constitution's written, they control the budget.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary RUMSFELD. And I can read.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, without getting into the substance of the comments of complaints by retired generals, has there been any significant impact on the morale of the men and women in the Department of Defense because of those disagreements?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't know that—I haven't done any polling or taken temperatures in that. I haven't noticed anything. Ask General Pace. He's around all the time.

Senator SPECTER. How about it, General Pace?

General PACE. Sir, certainly not within the building. I'll reserve my comments, because you haven't asked a question. But General Hagee is the most recent Joint Chief to come back from overseas. During this time, this was all bubbling in the press. He received zero questions from any servicemember of any rank. Sergeant Major Gainey, who is a senior enlisted advisor to the chairman, travels all the time, and he comes back and reports back to me, as recently as last week, that, in all of his travels, with as many people as he meets, not a single person has asked that question. So, as far as morale of the force, no impact, sir.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, according to congressional research, 80 to 90 percent of the intelligence budget goes through, or is controlled by, the Department of Defense. Is that accurate?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, it's a matter of public record. I don't know what the percentage is. But a major portion is funded through the budget. And a portion of that ends up being administered by other intelligence agencies.

Senator SPECTER. Has there been any reduction in that DOD control since the creation of the Director of National Intelligence?

#### INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I think the answer is yes. I mean, clearly, once a law passes establishing the Director of National Intelligence and assigning certain responsibilities, we end up, technically, with somewhat less authority. On the other hand, before the law was passed I had a very close working relationship with the Director of Central Intelligence. Since the law has passed, I have worked very closely with the Director of CIA, as well as with the Director of National Intelligence. General Pace and I have lunch with him every week, and we've always had a very collegial relationship. And I wouldn't have thought of recommending to the President someone to head up a major DOD intelligence function without sitting down and talking to either the Director of CIA or the Director of National Intelligence, in this case, and discussing

it. And the same thing's done on budgets. We do things with respect to the budgets on various satellite systems, for example, and we've established various memorandas of understanding and methods of operating together. And it's a very collegial, constructive, continuous relationship. At the top, down in the field. It's excellent. I mean, you talk to General Abizaid or General Casey, they feel they have superb linkages with the agency. And it's in the middle, where people, you know, chatter with the press and stuff like that, that suggest to the contrary. And I read these articles, and I go to Negroponte or Porter Goss or Steve Cambone, and say, "What's this about?" I don't see it. And it reads like fiction to me. Obviously, somebody's feeding that stuff, but I don't get it. I think it's mythology.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, were the media reports accurate that there was a disagreement between you and General Hayden as to whether NSA would come under DNI or DOD?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I'm glad you asked that, Senator. Let me just tell you what happened.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I go to work every day and spend, you know, 12–13 hours working, and I meet with dozens and dozens of people all the time, and I hear their views all the time. I ask their views all the time. And if anyone thinks that everyone always recommends exactly what I think, they're wrong. It happens 20 times a day that someone makes a recommendation to General Pace or to me that I either don't have an opinion on—now, in the case of Hayden, General Hayden came in to me during the debate in the Congress about where the National Security Agency should be located. The President had not taken a position at that stage, certainly had not taken a position that it should be transferred from the Department of Defense to the DNI. General Hayden said he thought that it would make sense to have it transferred to the DNI. Were you in the meeting?

General PACE. I was, yes.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah. And others had a different opinion. And that was fine. And the President decided to not transfer it over to the DNI. And I agreed with the President.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for responding to my—letter from Senator Sessions and myself about the efforts in Colombia to liberate three men who were taken by the gangsters down there. And I've gotten a follow-up letter from General Sharp, and I appreciate that.

I've—I know, from the correspondence, that you share the view that—and you say you are doing everything that can be done. And I appreciate your maintaining that. I think it might be useful to let the folks on the ground know all the things that are going on, because there is a sense there, that Senator Sessions and I heard, that they thought more could be done. But—I'm assured by what you have to say, but I think some assurances to them would be helpful, as well.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and General Pace, for your service.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you—

Senator STEVENS. The Senator's time—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Senator.

Senator STEVENS [continuing]. Has expired.

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Pace—we deal with the Southern commander on this subject on a regular basis, and certainly he may know more than I know, but we don't know more than he knows.

General PACE. No, sir, I think we—I think what you said, sir, is that you understand the answer you got, but that there are some folks in the field who don't quite yet know everything that's going on. Is that correct, sir?

Senator SPECTER. Correct.

General PACE. And that is in Colombia on the ground sir, is that what you're—

Senator SPECTER. In Bogota.

General PACE. Yes, sir. We'll work with Southern Command, sir, and make sure that the people who should know, know, although everybody should not know everything—

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Domenici is recognized for 7 minutes.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Now, I'm not sure that I have 7 minutes worth of questions, but maybe I do.

First, I want to—want to do my usual and say, to both of you, thank you for the work you do. I'm sorry that we don't get to have you appear before us more often and talk about what's going on, but you get plenty of opportunity to talk with the American people about how you think things are going in the American involvement in Iraq and elsewhere. And I want to personally thank both of you for what you do. I think your work is well received.

Mr. Secretary, a couple of my questions will be parochial and not intended in any way to put you either on the spot or precipitate any decisionmaking. But you know we have Cannon Air Force Base over on the southern side of New Mexico. And it was created as a enclave, e-n-c-l-a-v-e, by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC). I understand, from the Secretary of the Air Force, that the proposal for what to do with the enclaved facility, since you were charged with doing something with it, it was said you shall, and that it has now cleared all of the various interdepartmental reviews. I just wanted to ask a general question. Is it fair to assume that it's not going to be a lengthy time before the decision would take place as to what goes into the enclave, since all of the interdepartmental reviews have already been completed? Is it fair to assume it will take—the decision will take place rather soon?

#### BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Domenici, my recollection is that there was an end date in the BRAC process by—

Senator DOMENICI. Well, it's way out—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. By which we had to have done it.

Senator DOMENICI. That's years from now.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well—



Senator DOMENICI. They leave the enclave open for a long time.  
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well——

Senator DOMENICI. But you are finished with your work, and I'm wondering when the decision would then be made.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, as I told you, we were very hopeful that we could get an answer to that well before that deadline date that the BRAC set. And I know you've met with the Secretary of the Air Force, and I've met with the Secretary of the Air Force, and they are not only aggressively looking to answer that question within the Air Force, but they're looking within other services and other agencies, as well. But I'd be reluctant to predict a date. This says the Air Force will complete its analysis in the late spring and apparently come up to me sometime midsummer. But then we have to see what we think about the recommendation. And they've been working closely with you throughout the process, and will continue to do so.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much.

Now, I have a—kind of, a real interest in UAVs. And I want to ask you if my assessment has any chance of being accurate. I believe that the operative—the ability to operate UAVs, continental United States, is being greatly impeded by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), that the UAVs are not getting the fair chance to participate within the national airspace system, which is controlled by the FAA. If that is the case—and I understand it is—why don't we look for some other space in the United States that is not controlled by them, that we might do the research and do the training? I have a suggestion that you would look at something like the airspace that we have at White Sands Missile Range. In any event, leave out the suggestion, and just talk with me a moment about whether my observation and thought that the UAV is being impeded, in terms of being—its implementation capabilities, because we can't fit it within the national airspace system and the FAA holds things up. Is that a fair assessment, or am I wrong?

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION COORDINATION ON UNMANNED  
AERIAL VEHICLES

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I don't sit in the shoes of the FAA, so I can't say whether it's being impeded. It is clear that they are wrestling with the issue of how unmanned aircraft should be managed in airspace that they control. And it is, I think, probably not a simple question, and it's complicated. At the present time, these certificates of authorization for unmanned aircraft to operate in controlled airspace take, you know, 60 to 120 days to get through. I'm not in a position to judge it. All I can tell you is, we're working very hard with the FAA to try to develop the flexibility that would be desirable. This is a new thing, unmanned aircraft flying around in airspace where there are manned aircraft. And it is not a simple thing, I think. And they—we don't have the rules or the procedures or the arrangements or the understanding or the confidence, and we simply have to just work it through with them. And we are, as you know—we share your desire to see it get resolved as soon as possible.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, Mr. Secretary, I just want to suggest to you that everything you have just said is correct, but when I look

at how long it has been taking for all of this to evolve, it's not months, it's years—1964 is when all this started. I do at least want to close this little discussion by urging that everything possible be done to expedite this work, so we can take advantage of it. It's—they're needed on all different fronts, and we've got to train them within this American zone, and that's being deterred. So, I just lay that before you and urge it, and thank you for your response.

I have another one that I just want to suggest, that things are being done well in one part of the Defense Department, and I wonder if you would consider broadening it. Water purification. And I address this issue to you, General Pace. As you know, it has been a tremendous problem for the Department, and it—right down to marines who are trying to have clean water as they go through the filthiest war zones you can imagine. And there are ways to produce clean water for them rather quickly, in scientifically different ways.

I want to tell you that the United States Marine Corps has worked to develop an individual water purifier system that will enable soldiers to gather water from any source, anywhere, and purify it into drinking water that meets the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards. I'm sure—

Senator STEVENS. Senator, this will have to be your last question, General. It's—

Senator DOMENICI. Okay.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Senator DOMENICI. Fine. I just want to know, since those efforts are within one department, General Pace, would it be fair to say that, since they are so important, that these efforts are being considered for the broader Defense Department so that they are not just for one department, but for the entire military, because they all need these kinds of things?

General PACE. Sir, that is exactly correct. It is fair to say that. And, in fact, when I was the chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, we had the Marine Corps brief the other services on just those plans. And they are moving forward on that. It will be a joint effort, sir.

Senator DOMENICI. It will be a joint effort.

General PACE. Yes, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Dorgan is recognized.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm sorry I was at another hearing, but I've read the testimony.

General Pace, you indicated that, in your percentages to Senator McConnell, the number of Iraqi troops that have been trained. And you talked about the number of them that are controlling territory on their own, and the amount of territory they're controlling. And yet, you said, in response to Senator Durbin, that there is no territory that is sufficiently controlled by Iraqi troops that would allow the withdrawal of all American troops. Those two answers seem at odds, to me. Can you explain them?

General PACE. Sir, thanks for the opportunity to clarify. The specific question that Senator Leahy asked me was, was there any of the 18 provinces that could be completely turned over to Iraqi forces? When I answered him, I said, "No, sir." What I should have

said, to make sure everyone understood, was that, for an entire province to take all U.S. and coalition forces out inside the next 3 months, the answer to that question is, "No, sir." That——

Senator DORGAN. So, the——

General PACE [continuing]. Does not mean that they're not making great progress on the ground. As I said, in Baghdad they have over half, and other——

Senator DORGAN. But——

General PACE [continuing]. Locations.

Senator DORGAN. But Senator Durbin made the point that I would make, as well. We have now been, I think, 2 years or 3 years—I guess, 2 years—hearing a lot of good things about Iraqi security being trained up. And yet, it seems to me, at some point in a reasonable time, we should have trained up enough to be able to say to the Iraqi people, "This is your country. The country of Iraq belongs to you, not us. And you have to decide whether you have the will and the capability, given the amount of money that we've spent training your security, to provide the security for yourselves in your own country." At some point, the Iraqi people have to make that judgment. And, at some point, it seems to me, we have to bring American troops home. I understand the importance of all of this, but I do think we've had a lot of discussion for a long time about how much progress we're making, and yet none of the territories that you've described—would we be able to bring American troops out of the territory and turn the territory—the province completely over to the Iraqi troops.

I want to just—I want to ask about the retired generals, Secretary Rumsfeld. And I wondered whether I should do this, but I want to do it. All the time that I have served here, and the decades before, I have not heard half a dozen retired generals or so, some four stars, some very significant military leaders, having retired, openly critical—in fact, I think, in a couple of cases, calling for your resignation. Let me ask the question of you. Do—you've heard these criticisms. Do you take them seriously? Are there—are these criticisms by retired generals, are they raising legitimate issues? Are they issues that resonate with you? Give me your assessment of what's happening with some very significant criticism from folks who used to be military leaders in this country.

#### RETIRED GENERALS' CRITICISM

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, sure I take things seriously. And I've wanted to reflect on it. I read a lot of history, and I guess I don't think there's ever been a war where there haven't been disputes and differences among generals, and between generals and civilians, and among civilians. Think back, General McClellan called Abraham Lincoln a "gorilla" and an "ape." So, this is not new. There hasn't been a time when there haven't been people of different views.

There are 7,500 active and retired generals and admirals. You've characterized what some have said. It's a relatively unusual thing, and I quite agree with you in that regard. And then you say, Is any of it valid? There are those who have consistently disagreed with the size of the force. And I guess history's going to have to make that judgment. But the truth is that the size of the force was the

size that was selected by General Tom Franks, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, one of whom is sitting next to me, recommended to the President. And that was the number.

Now, if people don't like that number, and they want to blame somebody, fine, they blame me. That goes with the territory. It is a fact that it is a tough call. It's not a science; it's an art, coming up with those numbers.

The second thing I would say is, I really honestly believe that if you undertake the kinds of transforming in this Department, any big department, and if you do something, somebody's not going to like it. And we've done a lot. We have a new personnel system that the Congress passed that a lot of people don't like, and they're arguing. We've put a marine in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for the first time, and there are people who don't like that. I brought a retired general in to run the Army, and there are people who didn't like that.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary RUMSFELD. We've done a lot to change that Department, and, in every instance, there's resistance, as there always will be in big organizations.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, we're stretched pretty thin on a range of—in a range of areas—National Guard and other areas. Do you foresee any circumstance under which, in the future, the Secretary of Defense will recommend the reinstitution of a military draft?

#### MILITARY DRAFT

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I hate to answer the second part first, but I will. The answer is, flat, no. We don't need a draft. It would be harmful to reinstitute a draft. We have a country of, what, close to 300 million people, and we have an active duty force of 1.4 million, and Guard and Reserve of another 450,000. And all we need to do is what anyone else with a volunteer entity has to do, and that's adjust the incentives so that you can attract and retain the people you need and have to have to defend this country. And, thank the good Lord, there are plenty of people putting their hands up and volunteering to do that, even though they could possibly be in a safer position or a more comfortable position. And they're doing it.

So I wouldn't even think of it. But, in my view, the premise of your question was wrong. You say the Guard and the Reserve and the force is stressed.

Senator DORGAN. No, I said stretched pretty thin.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Stretched pretty thin. Well, I mean, I think that they are doing a terrific job, and we are moving a number of military people out of civilian functions into military functions, tens of thousands. So, we're increasing the size of the force and reducing that stress. We have a meeting once a month, going over all—something like 37 things, 38 things—to reduce stress on the force, and stretch—I forget the word you used—but—

Senator DORGAN. Stretched thin. But let me make the point, I didn't suggest they weren't doing a great job. That wasn't the point of my question.

Secretary RUMSFELD. No, I know that. But in terms of the “stretched thin,” I mean, out of the blue, people are saying, “Oh, my goodness, the President wants to put 6,000 people down to help the Border Patrol, and the Guard’s already exhausted.” Well, the fact of the matter is, only about—the force over in Iraq is about 19 percent Guard and Reserve, I think, at the present time, General Blum. And we’ve got 450,000 Guard and Reserve. And he’s talking about 6,000 for 1 year, and they’re going to be doing it on their active duty for training. There’s so much misinformation flying around about this, and it is not going to be a stress on the National Guard to do that function. They’re going to be able to do what the Governors need them to do as well. I have every confidence that they can do that.

General PACE. Senator, may I have—

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, my time is—yes?

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, may I impose on you to ask for 1 minute?

Senator STEVENS. Yes, sir.

General PACE. Thank you. Because it’s important, as I sit here representing the uniformed military, that I speak my mind about the opportunity for the uniformed leadership to inform, digest, debate, have dialogue with the civilian leadership. And it is a daily ongoing process, whether it be a combatant commander who brings his ideas forward to “The Tank” and the Secretary, and we have the iterative process that goes on every day, or if it’s the 2 to 3 to 4 to 5 hours every day that I spend with the Secretary of Defense listening to briefings. Every single officer who walks into the Secretary of Defense’s office is expected to speak his or her mind, and is encouraged to do so. And our Armed Forces need to understand clearly from their chairman that all of their leaders are expected, encouraged, and are afforded the opportunity to have a very open, honest dialogue about what we believe and what we don’t believe.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, let me thank both the General and the Secretary for coming and making themselves available for questions. And I expect you started, as we all would, to thank the men and women who wear America’s uniform.

Senator STEVENS. Well, thank you very much.

I’m constrained to say that I recall the days of the draft. And Senator Goldwater and I didn’t believe that a draft should take place in a democracy, short of an all-out war. And I introduced an amendment to draft women. Did you know that, Mr. Secretary? And, of course, it failed the Senate. But the Senate woke up to the fact that it was discrimination, and it was not a time when we should have a draft. We still have registration for the draft, still have the possibility of a draft if we get into a world war.

But, second, I think you were very fair in your questions, and we appreciate the Secretary’s answer to clear up the thing.

But I have been privileged, Mr. Secretary, at your invitation—and I think Senator Inouye’s gone to some—to go to some of the dinners that you’ve had informally with your—members of the Joint Chiefs and with other officers. And I can tell you that, in my 38 years, I’ve never seen the ambience that I have seen, in terms of the open dialogue, General, open discussion, and sometimes with wives, sometimes without them, the Secretary has had these gath-

erings. And I personally appreciate the openness that is existing now in the military. I think military officers feel free to stand up and say what they want to say, whether they're retired or otherwise. And that's—this is the democracy. First amendment still applies to people in uniform, General. And I appreciate the fact that you're insisting on that, and that the Secretary encourages it.

#### ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

So, we appreciate your coming. We appreciate both of your service to this Nation, and, really, can't tell you how much we all appreciate the overwhelming courage and commitment of the young people under your command.

So, we'll stand in—

Senator, do you have any further comment?

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department subsequent to the hearing:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

*Question.* Do you agree that, since these facilities are associated with BRAC recommendations, BRAC funds should be used for these construction projects?

*Answer.* Yes, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) funds should be used for the construction requirements associated with Commission recommendation number 33 (Reserve Component Transformation in New Mexico) and Commission recommendation number 187 (Defense Research Service Led Laboratories).

*Question.* What does Fort Bliss need from White Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force Base in order to conduct field testing relating to the Future Combat System in New Mexico?

*Answer.* Fort Bliss, Texas, was selected as the home for field testing the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) because of its access to White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) and the proximity to the Holloman Air Force Base. The area provides the requisite land, airspace, and facilities for Evaluation Brigade Combat Team Soldiers to fully train, test and evaluate FCS capabilities. Other examples of support include air traffic control, frequency management, and range scheduling. We anticipate using these resources at all affected facilities. While the development, training and testing of an FCS-equipped force is a significant task, from a test/training event coordination perspective it is one that is not dissimilar from other major exercises such as Roving Sands. Success will depend on close coordination and communication between the FCS program management office, Fort Bliss, WSMR, and Holloman AFB. Much work has already occurred. WSMR and Fort Bliss have conducted regular interchanges in the past and continue to coordinate emerging detailed requirements. Similarly, there are joint agreements between WSMR and Holloman AFB that will be exercised as more detailed test plans are finalized.

*Question.* Mr. Secretary, I would appreciate your perspective on the importance of basic research.

*Answer.* Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored basic research produces new knowledge and understanding that underpins the development of future military capabilities. Prior basic research enabled us to develop today's revolutionary military capabilities, including the Global Positioning System, stealth, night vision devices, and precision strike. We expect equally important new capabilities to emerge over the long-term from today's investments in basic research. Our support for basic research today will help to give future leaders the capability edge they need to deter potential adversaries and, if necessary, conduct military operations.

Basic research has an additional long-term benefit to the DOD because universities are the predominant performers of basic research in this country and university research is inextricably linked with the training of scientists and engineers in fields important to national defense. DOD-supported basic research thereby helps to ensure the future availability of talent needed for defense research and development.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

*Question.* Has the Department of Defense (DOD) determined which items from the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) will be offered to the Republic of Korea (ROK)? Has a formal offer been made to the ROK? If so, please provide a comprehensive list with types and quantities. Please also indicate what items are not being offered.

*Answer.* Yes, DOD has determined which items from the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) will be offered to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in negotiations. Pending authority to negotiate a War Reserve Stockpile agreement, a formal offer has not been made to the ROK. Although a formal offer has not been made to the ROK, attached are seven lists of the types and quantities of items that will be offered to the ROK, and items that will not be offered, as follows: (1) U.S. Army WRSA-K munitions items that will be offered; (2) U.S. Army WRSA-K munitions items that will be retained; (3) U.S. Army WRSA-K non-munitions items that will be offered; (4) U.S. Army WRSA-K non-munitions items that will be retained; (5) U.S. Navy WRSA-K munitions items that will be offered; (6) U.S. Air Force WRSA-K munitions items that will be offered; and (7) U.S. Air Force WRSA-K munitions items that will be retained.

*Question.* Has a formal offer been made to the ROK? If so, please provide a written copy.

*Answer.* No, a formal offer has not been made to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

*Question.* Please provide the number, quantity and type of antipersonnel mines and mine-related equipment, including delivery systems, now included in the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea.

*Answer.* The number of Claymore K143 mines now in War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) stocks is 166,895. Of that number, 57,625 will be retained by the Army. The number of Claymore K145 mines now in WRSA-K stocks is 25,580. A total of 134,580 Claymore mines (K143 and K145) will be negotiated for transfer to the Republic of Korea (ROK). There also are 83,479 K092 mines and 480,267 K121 mines in WRSA-K stocks. All of the K092 or K121 mines will be retained by the Army. There is no other mine-related equipment, including delivery systems, in the WRSA-K stocks.

## U.S. ARMY WRSA-K MUNITIONS TO BE RETAINED

DODIC	CC	QOH	TRANSFER TO KOREA	RETAIN FOR U.S. USE	ACC	NOMENCLATURE
K092 .....	A .....	24,543	.....	24,543	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M16 SERIES W/FU
K092 .....	H .....	2	.....	2	DRK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M16 SERIES W/FU
K092 .....	N .....	58,934	.....	58,934	WRK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M16 SERIES W/FU
K121 .....	A .....	480,267	.....	480,267	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M14 NON METALLI
K143 .....	A .....	57,625	.....	57,625	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M18A1 W/ACCESSO
TOTALS .....	.....	.....	.....	621,371	.....	

## U.S. ARMY WRSA-K MUNITIONS TO BE OFFERED

DODIC	CC	QOH	TRANSFER TO KOREA	RETAIN FOR U.S. USE	ACC	NOMENCLATURE
K143 .....	E .....	99,736	99,736	.....	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M18A1 W/ACCESSO
K143 .....	F .....	9,518	9,518	.....	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M18A1 W/ACCESSO
K143 .....	H .....	6	6	.....	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M18A1 W/ACCESSO
K143 .....	H .....	10	10	.....	DRK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M18A1 W/ACCESSO
K145 .....	E .....	25,580	25,580	.....	ROK ...	MINE ANTIPERSONNEL: M18A1 WITHOUT F
TOTALS .....	.....	.....	.....	134,850	.....	

*Question.* Is the transfer of antipersonnel mines from the WRSA-K to the ROK permissible under the comprehensive U.S. moratorium on export of antipersonnel mines?

*Answer.* It is permissible to transfer all the Claymore mines (K143 and K145) in the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) stocks to the Republic of Korea (ROK). None of the K092 or K121 mines will be included in the negotiations for possible transfer.

*Question.* If the DOD plans to transfer antipersonnel mines and mine-related equipment to the ROK, please identify the items, quantity, cost to the ROK, and the country where they are located at this time.

*Answer.* DOD will negotiate to transfer to the Republic of Korea (ROK) 109,270 of the K143 Claymore mines and 25,580 of the K145 Claymore mines. The cost to the ROK is not known at this time. The cost will be based on fair market value as offset by concessions to be negotiated. All of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) Claymore mines are currently located in the ROK.

*Question.* If antipersonnel mines are to be transferred, what is the timetable?

*Answer.* There is no timetable established to transfer any of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) items to the Republic of Korea (ROK) government. It is likely that all items negotiated for transfer will be transferred at the same time. All transfers will be completed by December 2008. (Public Law 109-159 requires that all transfers authorized under the provision will be completed within three years of enactment of the provision.)

*Question.* If the DOD does not intend to offer the antipersonnel mines in the WRSA-K to the ROK, or if the ROK government does not want the mines, how does the DOD intend to dispose of them?

*Answer.* If during the negotiations the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government indicates it does not want the Claymore mines that are available for transfer, then DOD intends to demilitarize them in the ROK or retrograde them back to the United States for demilitarization.

*Question.* Are any U.S. antipersonnel mines stored in Japan as part of WRSA-K? Would the transfer of any such mines out of Japan to the ROK be permissible under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Convention), to which Japan is party?

*Answer.* None of the U.S. antipersonnel mines in War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) are stored in Japan. All of the WRSA-K mines are stored in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

#### SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator STEVENS. We'll stand in recess. We'll reconvene on Wednesday, May 24, when we're going to start hearing from public witnesses regarding the Department of Defense request for 2007.

Thank you very much.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for those remarks.

General PACE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., Wednesday, May 17, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, May 24.]